Asia-Pacific Reporting Blog

Rohrabacher on “Unearthing Economic Wealth”

2012-02-23T16:41:00.001-05:00

Congressman Dana Rohrabacher (R - CA) says that he does not sharethe opinion of others, includingBor, that untapped economic opportunities inBalochistan should be a major driving force for U.S. support of anindependent Balochistan.

While he understands that there aresignificant economic opportunities in Balochistan, he says that anyaccusation that his hearing was about economicopportunities like oil, gas, and minerals is “a bunch of leftistgarbage from liberal professors. What really upsets policymakers isthat Americans are being killed by Pakistanis. This is ouroverwhelming consideration. Is it fair to say that Balochistan’snatural resources are being exploited and the Baloch are being leftas the poorest in Pakistan – yes. Would I hope that the free peopleof Balochistan would build their country in partnership with Americancompanies instead of dictatorship Chinese ones – yes. But, sucheconomic considerations would be one point and American securityinterests the other ninety-nine on a 100 point scale.”

These comments originally were part of the Huffington Post interview with the Congressman but had to be removed for reasons of length.

Balochistan Hearing Coverage

2012-02-23T15:56:00.004-05:00

On February 8, 2012, Congress held a public hearing on "Baluchistan." Advocates of the Baloch cause believe the hearing was a historic day for their independence movement. However, not all agree that the hearing was a good thing for the United States foreign policy or Baloch human rights. The hearing therefore is a controversial event which threatens to further undermine U.S.-Pakistan relations. The question is: Was it worth the risk? I therefore have sat down with many of the witnesses and Congressmen to hear their perspectives. The ones which have already been published can be found below.

Congress Member Interviews

RohrabacherBelieves "Pakistani Government Does Not Deserve Respect"

Wintess Interviews

Borsays “No peace in Balochistan without referendum”

Fairtold hearing called to “Stick it to the Pakistanis”

Husanplans to limit conversation to human rights in Pakistan

Analysis

Post-Hearing Analysis: ShouldCongress support dismembering Af-Pak?

Pre-Hearing Analysis: BalochCould Divide Administration and Congress on Pakistan Policy

Arctic-Pacific Security Complex

2012-02-23T11:01:00.004-05:00

I have been working on a new project which looks at emerging Arctic-Pacific security linkages. As part of my work, I recently interviewed the Norwegian Ambassador to the U.S. on the topic. Aspects of the interview are now available over at The Diplomat: "How Norway Sees the Arctic."

“No peace in Balochistan without referendum”

2012-02-23T10:24:00.001-05:00

As the only witness of Baloch ethnicityto speak at the recent Balochistan public hearing before the UnitedStates Congress, Mr. M. Hossein Bor disagrees with comments that hewas not relevant to the proceedings. Not only was he the only witnessable to speak as a Baloch, he points out that he also was the onlyone with deep subject matter expertise in foreign trade andinvestment in Southwest Asia. From this perspective, he hoped histestimony would have shed light on the unrealized strategic andeconomic opportunities that an independent Baluchistan would provideto Americans, including the ability to contain a rising China and anemerging Iran, prevent an adversarial Pakistan from achievingstrategic depth in Afghanistan, and ensure Baloch-American economicprosperity through new energy and mineral resource agreements.However, with little time to prepare for the hearing and only fiveminutes of allotted time to provide oral testimony, many of thesepoints were not expressed. Bor therefore looks to this post-hearingassessment as a mechanism to share publicly for the first time whathe has shared privately with Baloch nationalists and theirsupporters. As one of the five witnesses called before Congress, itis assured that these remarks will be closely watched by all side tothe Baloch debate.

Great Game 2.0

To understand Balochistan, Bor believesthat one cannot look at Balochistan through the Afghanistan-Pakistan(AfPak)box. In retrospect, this is perhaps one of the strongestcontributions that he could have made at the hearing.

For Bor, Balochistan must be understoodin the larger context of Southwestern Asia: “As everyone knows,there was a great game in this same area in the 19^thcentury and the Afghans and Baloch were the victims. This great gamehas now been renewed but, instead of the British and Russian Empires,the competition is now between China-India, China-U.S., Iran-U.S.,Pakistan-India, and Pakistan-U.S. This competition threatens U.S.strategic and economic interests.”

He therefore counters the opinion ofother witnesses who felt that the hearing should have been limited tothe Balochistan province of Pakistan: “There are many interrelatedissues at play. When one discusses Balochistan, you are discussing away to contain China. You are also discussing economic relationshipsbetween Iran and Pakistan. And, you are talking about energy securityfor the U.S. and its allies.”

With respect to China, Bor says thatthe strategic and economic importance of Baluchistan cannot beunderestimated: “If (the Chinese) build their port in Gwadar, theywill have a land route from Western China to the Indian Ocean. Thisis of strategic interest to the United States because Chinese shipswould have a direct route to China and no longer have to transit pastthe Indian and American navies. It therefore is logical thatBalochistan should be concerned as part of the larger shift to thePacific announced by the Obama Administration. Furthermore, CentralAsia has the largest oil reserves in the world after the Middle East.Balochistan provides an alternative way to get those resources to theinternational market beside China and Russia.”

He makes a similar argument for Iran:“Iran is an empire and they are using Baloch lands to try to becomethe dominant regional player. The Iranians are using the Strait ofHormuz as a chokepoint for a huge percentage of the world’s oil.They also are building a pipeline to Pakistan which violates U.N.sanctions. Such growing Iran-Pakistan cooperation is a majorconcern.” In his mind, an independent Balochistan extending fromKarachi to the Strait of Hormuz would not only contain an emergingIran but also provide a long-term security guarantee against China,Iran, and Pakistan emerging as revisionist maritime powers in theregion.

Safeguarding Afghanistan

While Bor does not believe thatBalochistan should be limited to the AfPak box, he neverthelessrecognizes its extreme relevance to any discussion on the future ofBalochistan.

From his perspective, Balochistan mustbe viewed not as an internal issue for Pakistan but rather as part ofa larger regional struggle between the Baloch and Afghan nationalistsand secularists against Afghan and Pakistani fundamentalists:“Pakistan and the Taliban are based upon fundamentalist Islam. Theyare the natural enemies of secularists and nationalists. Thisprovides the natural ingredients that bring Afghans and Balochtogether. The Baloch issue therefore is bigger than the internalstruggle between Pakistan and its three large ethnic groups.”

Bor hopes that hearing will spur afollow-on national debate that will increase American awareness ofthe larger regional dynamics at play with Balochistan: “Noteveryone understands that the Baloch have been naturally allied withthe Afghan minorities and Pashtuns. The governments in power inAfghanistan have historically supported the Baloch and neitherrecognizes the Durand Line. That is why there will always be strongcooperation between Baloch and Pashtun nationalists. They alsorecognize that they need Balochistan to have access to the IndianOcean and the Gulf.”

In familiarizing themselves with theregional dynamics, Bor hopes that Americans will appreciate that thereincorporation of the Taliban into Afghan politics will notnecessarily undermine Baloch nationalists: “There are all kinds ofpossibilities if the Taliban return to power. There is no guaranteethat they will trust Pakistan anymore. Plus, they themselves neverrecognized the Durand Line. So, one cannot conclude at this time thatthis harms the independent Balochistan cause.”

He consequently sees multiple policyoptions on the table for policymakers which allow them to pursuedifference Afghan policy options while still advancing Baloch rightsto self-determination.

Unearthing Economic Wealth

According to Bor, one of the mostoverlooked reasons why Balochistan has emerged as a major issue hasbeen “the tremendous deposits of oil, gas, and minerals. Inaddition to human rights and geopolitics, this is a major reason whyit has appeared on the international radar.”

Bor believes that Balochistan will beof increasing importance to the international community in the yearsahead: “The Chinese are late-comers to the energy security game. Atthis point, Western oil companies control mostly of the supplies.Central Asia is one region where this is not the case. This isdriving economic competition.”

However, Bor fears that Americans,including those in Congress, do not recognize the economic potentialof the region. He therefore sees the hearing as the mechanism bywhich to introduce economic opportunities in Balochistan into thewider national debate about the future of U.S. AfPak policy.

New Cards on the Table

Bor believes that the hearing washistoric for a number of reasons. Of course, it was the 1^sthearing in the Congress to directly tackle Baloch affairs. But, moreimportantly in Bor’s opinion, the hearing introduced new policyoptions to Congressmen that “should have been considered yearsago.”

Bor underscores the importance ofhaving such policy options on the table: “One of the main areas ofweakness for U.S. policy in the Middle East and Southwest Asia hasalways been that it did not play to regional dynamics. This was truein Iraq as well as Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, there has always beensupport for the Baloch but the U.S. was never willing to play thiscard. The U.S. would not play the game in Iraq or Afghanistan andtake advantage of regional dynamics. But, given Iranian and Pakistanibrutalization and colonialism against the Baloch, this card hasfinally been raised before Congress.”

He also feels that the hearing hasreinvigorated the Baloch diaspora to work within the U.S. polticalsystem to pressure their government to play this new card, “TheBaloch diaspora was late in the Washington game on AfPak policy. Theynow recognize the importance of playing the game and understand howto do so as a result of the hearing.”

For these reasons, Bor is optimisticthat the hearing was not just a one-off event to “tick offPakistan.” Instead, he believes it marks an important milestonealong the road to independence for Balochistan: “There aredifferent positions in the U.S. Government but U.S. policies arechanging. They now understand the strategic imperative of anindependent Balochistan from the Strait of Hormuz to Karachi. Thehearing and bill mark the first time in history that any member ofthe U.S. Government has officially recognized an independentBalochistan. Even if the State Department and Administration do notsupport the hearing, they must now recognize that the kill and dumpcampaign by Pakistan’s military and intelligence is designed todestroy the very idea of secular and nationalist Baloch. The hearingshowed that there will be no peace in the region without a referendumof self-determination. That cannot be ignored.”

EddieWalsh is a senior foreign correspondent who covers Africa andAsia-Pacific. He also is a non-resident fellow at Pacific Forum CSIS.Follow him on Twitter here.

Dr.M. Hossein Bor is a D.C.-basedlawyer who facilitates trade, joint ventures, investment, and projectdevelopment between American corporations and their counterparts fromthe Gulf countries. He also is the author of “Iran and ItsNationalities: The Case of Baluch Nationalism.” Dr. Borpreviously served as Energy and Economic Advisor to the Embassy ofthe State of Qatar in Washington, D.C. from 1982 to 1998. The viewsexpressed by Dr. Bor do not necessarily reflect those of theinterviewer nor The Asia-Pacific Reporting Blog.

This interview originally appeared in DAWN Newspapers on 2/21/2012 but was later removed from their site.

Australia and Fiji: Radical Differences in Coup Narratives

2012-02-04T00:20:00.000-05:00

How will historyremember Commodore Bainimarama of the Republic of Fiji? This is the questionthat Fergus Hanson (Lowy Institute Fellow) and I seek to answer in my mostrecent article which is now featured on Huffington Post.

“Fiji’s Competing Narratives and Uncertain Future”

New Fiji Article Coming Soon

2012-02-03T16:15:00.001-05:00

Over the weekend, my latest article on Fiji will be published. My co-author for the new piece is Fergus Hanson of the Lowy Institute. This marks my fourth publication on Fiji this year. The other three can be found below:

Al Jazeera English - "Fiji: A Bottle Half-Empty or Half-Full?"
Diplomatic Courier - "Time for a New Policy Approach to Fiji?"
The Diplomat - "Fiji Explores Its Options"

Congressional Hearing Scheduled on Pakistani Balochistan

2012-02-02T21:28:00.002-05:00

On February 8^th, Dana Rohrabacher (R-CA) will chair a U.S. Congressional hearing that will touch on the Baloch situation in Pakistan. Although not confirmed, it is expected that the hearing will tackle issues related to whether or not the U.S. Congress should tie human rights issues in Balochistan to Pakistani aid.

Baloch Could Divide Administration and Congress on Pakistan (and Afghan) Policy

2012-01-28T01:46:00.001-05:00

It has been almost a year since my last piece on Huffington Post, but I published my latest article there earlier today. The topic is Pakistan and the focus is on how Balochistan is starting to divide the Obama Administration and State Department, on one side, and a small but growing group of Congressmen on the other. This was a challenging piece because it required over a dozen interviews and weeks of research. I happy to see it released and I look forward to receiving feedback from my readers. In the end, it is a sensitive topic and, as a journalist, I am by no means taking sides on either U.S. or Pakistan domestic politics. I only hope the piece is received as an objective, impartial, and accurate depiction of the situation.

Huffington Post – “Baloch Could Divide Administration and Congress on Pakistan Policy”

According to VOA Spokesman, No Balochi Language Service Currently Planned

2012-01-25T01:04:00.003-05:00

The Baluch diaspora in the United States regularly make mention of the need for a VOA Balochi language service. Some members of the diaspora have expressed their hope that the proposed U.S. Consulate in Quetta - now at an impasse - would provide an easy mechanism for launching such a service. I therefore took a moment yesterday to reach out to VOA directly to solicit their views on the matter. My conversation with Kyle King, VOA Public Relations spokesman, revealed that the VOA is nowhere close to opening such a service: “There is no current plan for a service in Balochi. But, from time to time, plans are re-evaluated. Ultimately, any decision to open a new service would need to be authorized by Congress."

Delicate Balancing of American, Chinese, Indian, and Nepali Interests

2012-01-25T00:47:00.001-05:00

"The Diplomat is running a series of interviews with Washington DC-based ambassadors on defense, diplomacy, and trade in the Asia-Pacific region. The sixth interview in the series, conducted by Washington correspondent Eddie Walsh, features Ambassador Shankar P. Sharma, of the Federal Democratic Republic of Nepal. His country recently resolved the final terms of the peace deal that brings a formal end to the civil war. After more than a decade of conflict, Nepal now faces new challenges, including reconstituting the government, redressing caste and race-based divisions, spurring economic growth, and adapting to a changing regional security environment. Ambassador Sharma tackles a number of these issues, with particular emphasis on regional diplomacy and security issues."

The Diplomat - "Nepal Balances Interests"

Nepal's Economy On the Rise in the Himalayas

2012-01-25T00:40:00.002-05:00

“After more than a decade of conflict and instability, Nepal is seeking to rebuild a deeply divided country. While the formal conflict may have ended, Nepali society remains deeply cleaved around ethnic, racial, and caste-based divisions. The government has begun implementing new policies aimed at redressing these divisions. These policies have been met with international acclaim. However, the impoverished country cannot rely of the goodwill generated by these policies alone. Nor, can it remain dependent upon foreign aid forever. The government acknowledges that one of the keys to long-term peace and stability will be generating stronger economic growth. The Nepal Ambassador to the United States, Shankar Sharma, therefore sat down with senior foreign correspondent Eddie Walsh to discuss how his government is working to rebuild the economy in 2012.”

The Interpreter (Lowy Institute for International Policy) – “Nepal’s Economy Has Big Mountains to Climb”

Nepal Seeks to Overcome Its Past to Seize Its Future

2012-01-13T15:32:00.004-05:00

After a decade of civil war, Nepal is finally starting to move forward as a regional player in South Asia. But first, the country will need to redress deep ideological, ethnic, and caste-based social cleavages which have long-divided its society.

I therefore was grateful for the opportunity to sit down for an exclusive one-on-one interview with Ambassador Shankar Sharma to discuss the opportunities and challenges which face Nepal in 2012. It was an expansive conversation – covering a range of topics including economic development and trade, crime, human rights, South Asian security, climate change, U.S.-Nepal relations, and foreign assistance. I hope that you will enjoy it.

Al Jazeera English - “Nepal re-emerging on the international scene”

Will 2012 Bring Change in Fiji?

2012-01-11T18:48:00.006-05:00

On January 4th, I had the opportunity to interview Ambassador Winston Thompson of the Republic of Fiji for the second time. The impetus for the interview was the announcement earlier this month by Commodore Bainimarama that Fiji would be lifting martial law.

My hope was to solicit his thoughts on Fiji’s future political direction and hear his reaction to the widespread criticism which still surrounds the regime in the West – particularly Australia and New Zealand. I also wanted to see what his outlook was on U.S.-Fiji relations in 2012.

Given the gap between the interview and publication, there was not an opportunity to raise the new regulations which came into force alongside the lifting of martial law. Perhaps that can be the topic for a future interview.

In the meantime, I would welcome readers’thoughts on whether you agree with Ambassador Thompson that Fiji is heading in the right direction or not.

Al Jazeera English: “Fiji: A bottle half-empty or half-full?”

First OpEd of 2012 Now Live

2012-01-01T11:03:00.001-05:00

With the new year upon us, my first OpEd of 2012 has just gone live at Al Jazeera English. The piece tackles how critical infrastructure cyber security (ex. industrial control systems exploits) emerged as a major issue in 2011. It then lays out the case for why the domestic cyber threat should be considered as one of the top stories of 2011.

2011: The Year of the Domestic Cyber Threat

Al Jazeera: “Bleak Outlook for Former FBI Agent Held in Iran”

2011-12-22T11:57:00.003-05:00

On December 22nd, Al Jazeera English published my latest opinion piece. The article tackles the case of the retired FBI agent who went missing in Iran. It attempts to examine why his family may be reaching out to the media now and whether their outreach is likely to help secure Mr. Levinson’s release. It does so in the context of the larger deterioration in the US - Iran and US - Pakistan relationships.

Bleak Outlook for Former FBI Agent Held in Iran

National Press Club Wire Open Letter - NPCJI

2011-12-14T15:52:00.005-05:00

Earlier today, I published an open letter to the members of the National Press Club (NPC) on the NPC Wire. The letter argues for the expansion in programs under the NPC Journalism Institute, a non-profit which arose from the Club, aimed at young and mid-career professional journalists. The piece is intended to contribute to the conversation on the future direction of the NPCJI in the context of the changing media landscape for the next generation of journalists. I would welcome any feedback on the piece, especially from young and mid-career professional journalists from Asia-Pacific who would benefit from the proposed programs.

Club Member Calls for Expanding Journalism Institute Mission to Target Young, Mid-career Reporters

China in Syria Series Recap

2011-12-09T02:21:00.003-05:00

From August 21 - September 7, I conducted a series of interviews with think tank scholars from Asia, Europe, Middle East, Oceania, and North America for The Diplomat’s China in Syria Series. The series was designed to tackle how China would react to the political unrest in Syria.

In recent days, I have been asked to consider conducting follow-up interviews as the UNSC prepares for further deliberation on the matter. Unfortunately, due to my other reporting requirements, I do not have the bandwidth to take on this request.

As a compromise, I have decided to summarize the content from the previous round of interviews below ...

Experts Interviewed

China in Syria Series

Dean Cheng - Research Fellow at the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation

China in Syria Series II

Prof. Eyal Zisser - Head of Middle Eastern and African History at Tel Aviv University and Senior Research Fellow at the Moshe Dayan Center

China in Syria Series III

Nina Hachigian and Peter Juul - Center for American Progress

China in Syria Series IV

Steven Heydemann - Senior Vice President at the United States Institute of Peace

China in Syria Series V

Hosuk Lee-Makiyama - Director, European Centre for International Political Economy
Barak Seener - Middle East Studies Research Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute
Dr Frans-Paul van der Putten - Senior Research Fellow, Asia Studies/Security and Conflict Programme at Clingendael
Dr. Olivier Roy - Head of Mediterranean Programme at European University Institute
Dr. Stepan Grigoryan - Chairman of the Board at Analytical Centre on Globalization and Regional Cooperation
Stephen Booth - Research Director at Open Europe
Dr. Karim Mezran - Centro Studi Americani / The Johns Hopkins University SAIS

Topics Covered

China in Syria Series

Possible spread of instability to Central Asia; Chinese concerns of regional contagion; China’s stance on the Arab Spring and its impact on China’s policy approach to Syria; Turkish-Chinese and Arab-Chinese relations.

China in Syria Series II

China/Russia and EU/US calls for Syrian regime change; Iranian influence; Economic Influence; Israeli calculations; Turkish impact; Lebanon factor; Israel and EU/US calls for Syrian regime change; Impact of Arab Spring on global power distribution.

China in Syria Series III

Chinese position on regime reform and its impact on EU/US policy approach; Country specific issues with China, India, Russia, South Africa, and Turkey; UNSC difficulties; China’s economic considerations; Biden’s agenda during VP trip to China; Impact of successful regime change in Libya; Bipartisan support in Congress.

China in Syria Series IV

Prospects for Chinese, Indian, and Russian support; Post-conflict Libya and Chinese calculations; Regional contagion and Turkish and Jordanian policy approaches; Degree of concessions West is willing to make for Chinese support; Reasons for hesitance on regime change; BRIC countires, the Arab Spring, and the global distribution of power; Right to Protect; Arab Spring and China’s relations in Africa; Impact of Jasmine Revolution.

China in Syria Series V

European Union position on Libya and Syria and Europe’s long-term strategic influence in the Asia-Pacific; Differences over the Libyan and Syrian uprisings from EU and Chinese/Russian perspectives.

New DC Ambassador Interview Series

2011-12-09T00:42:00.002-05:00

Over the last two months, I have had the privilege of spearheading a new one-on-one interview series at The Diplomat featuring Washington DC-based ambassadors. To-date, the series has presented conversations with ambassadors from Chile, Fiji, New Zealand, Sri Lanka, and Taiwan. In traditional Q&A format, the ambassadors have tackled a wide range of defense, diplomacy, and trade issues, including:

Ambassador Arturo Fermandois (Chile): Core national interests; Roles and responsibilities in the South Pacific; Middle power status pursuit or not; Strategic assessment of China and India; Perception of China’s satellite diplomacy in South America; Diplomatic engagement of other Western Hemisphere countries in Asia-Pacific; Bilateral relations with Bolivia (including the Atacama corridor); Bi-lateral relations with Peru; Non-traditional security issues and regional cooperation; Trans-Pacific Partnership; Energy sector investments; Homeland security and cyber warfare; Chile’s national identity; Public diplomacy.
Ambassador Winston Thompson (Fiji): US perception of coup; Future of democratic rule; Ethnic tensions; Coup culture; South Pacific multilateral relations (including Melanesian Spearhead Group and Pacific Island Forum); U.S. engagement with South Pacific; U.S. hegemony in Asia-Pacific; Chinese diplomatic and military assertiveness; Foreign aid and foreign direct investment; Engagement with ASEAN; Non-traditional security; Military modernization; South Pacific Stock Exchange; Transportation hub status; Cultural diplomacy; Sports diplomacy (including Rugby World Cup).
Ambassador Mike Moore (New Zealand): Regional security architecture; Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) Future; ARF, ADMM+, and EAS; South Pacific Security; Non-traditional security and South PAcific leadership; Chinese military and diplomatic assertiveness; U.S. hegemony; French engagement; National security strategy; Trade and strategic relationships.
Ambassador Jaliya Wickramasuriya (Sri Lanka): National security interests; Incumbent regime’s performance; Regional relations; Maritime security; Counter-terrorism; Regional architecture; Relations with China and India; WMD proliferation; Cyber security; Front Organizations; Indian Ocean tsunami; Non-traditional security concerns; Geo-location; Commonwealth; Japan’s role in Asia; Australia-U.S. military relations; Economic growth and political/social stability; Hi-tech sector; Public Diplomacy; Cricket.
Representative Jason Yuan (ROC/Taiwan): Six Party Talks and North Korean de-nuclearization; Regional security architecture; Diplomatic isolation; Non-traditional security issues; U.S.-Japan-South Korea Trilateral partnership; Defense Trade; Export controls; Non-proliferation compliance; Peace plan with PRC; Diplomatic recognition; Self-defense capabilities.

Through February, the series will continue to feature countries with significant diplomatic, economic, and security interests in the Asia-Pacific region. To keep up-to-date with the latest interviews, simply follow @aseanreporting.

Predator XP: General Atomics Readies Itself to Compete in Asia

2011-11-16T07:01:00.000-05:00

The Predator has been readied for export markets in Asia and the Middle East by its manufacturer, General Atomics Aeronautical. According to an interview with their director of business development, India is one of the main markets they seek to target. Given the demonstrated operational effectiveness of remotely piloted aircraft in U.S. COIN and ISR operations, there is significant interest in platforms such as the Predator XP on the international market. With the Administration now in support of the export of ISR-only RPAs to non-MTCR partner countries, the U.S. defense sector should now be able to compete with indigenous manufacturers and other niche players, who have seized on the opportunity to market their wares in emerging markets without strong competition from U.S. manufacturers.

Source: Eddie Walsh, “Predator Maker Redesigns UAV to Boost Exports,” AOL Defense, 11/15/2011.

Time to Rethink Cyber Anarchy

2011-11-15T21:47:00.001-05:00

Despite the serious threat posed by offensive cyber operations against computer networks and industrial control systems, the global community has been unwilling or unable to develop effective norms and institutions to govern and enforce cyber interactions between state and non-state actors. In the absence of proper governance, some would argue that a general state of cyber anarchy ensues which threatens global peace and stability to a degree rivaled only by high-end threats such as nuclear warfare.
While the United States has conducted three Nuclear Posture Reviews this decade “to determine what the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. security strategy should be,” there have been no similar assessments for other high-end capabilities, including cyber warfare. There also appears to be no effort to integrate U.S. policies on high-end threats, including nuclear and cyber, under a single policy umbrella. Finally, the promotion of global awareness for the serious threat posed by offensive cyber weapons proliferation does not appear to be high on the U.S. public diplomacy agenda.
Three years ago, the world faced a very different cyber threat landscape which was far more forgiving to such U.S. policy missteps. It was a world before Stuxnet, DigiNotar, Night Dragon, and Shady RAT. A world in which states were the only actors perceived capable of conducting major cyber attacks against critical infrastructure. A world in which national security experts failed to grasp the full potential of industrial control systems cyber attacks.
But, as noted industrial control systems cyber security expert and Ponemon Fellow Joe Weiss pointed out to me after a recent cyber conference in Washington, the cyber threat landscape has radically shifted since the days of Titan Rain, “We must recognize that we live in a new world. We have undergone a huge conceptual change in last eighteen months. There are now metasploits for industrial control systems available on the Internet. You no longer need to be a nation-state to carry out a major critical infrastructure cyber attack. The U.S. and other states need to come together to promote cyber security or the world is going to be in serious trouble.”
If the U.S. is serious about confronting the cyber security threat, Weiss believes that the first step is for U.S. policymakers to recognize the existential threat posed by industrial control system cyber (or blended physical and cyber) attacks: “I believe that U.S. policymakers do not fully understand the control system issues. In the IT world, the worst thing that a hacker can do is to shut down a network or steal information. In the industrial control systems world, they can take control and bring about physical destruction of critical infrastructure, including electric, water, oil, gas, chemical, and nuclear infrastructure.” For this reason, the U.S must treat the weaponization and proliferation of industrial control system cyber attacks as a high-end threat.
Even in the absence of new legislation, U.S. policymakers could pressure the US Department of Homeland Security and Department of Energy to increase regulations related to industrial control system cyber security. Weiss also believes that they could mandate new federal cyber security policy and procedures and training and awareness programs for critical infrastructure providers.
In the meantime, Weiss assesses that the risk posed by an offensive cyber attack against the nation’s critical infrastructure is growing: “There have already been more than 10 nuclear plant cyber incidents. While not all were malicious, these incidents demonstrate that cyber can affect the availability of key components at such plants, such as a water pump required to cool the reactor,” says Weiss. “The problem is that we can’t even tell if incidents such as these are malicious because we don’t have adequate cyber forensics let alone adequate preventative measures.”
To illustrate this point, Weiss shares a story relayed by an expert at a recent conference: “There was a presentation on a recent cyber incident at steel mill in Brazil that compromised control system networks. Unfortunately, experts still can’t identify the initiation point or when the code was inserted.”
He also warns “there are some very significant issues that happened at Fukishima, including loss of off-site power, which a directed cyber attack may be able to replicate. And, there is little chance to be able to find such a sophisticated cyber attack against control systems until it’s too late.”
Ultimately, Weiss is not only concerned by the failings of the U.S. Government. He also lacks confidence in international bodies, including IAEA, charged with propagating standards to ensure the safety and security of critical infrastructure: “I have personally reviewed the IAEA cyber specifications. The document is not very strong when it comes to cyber security for control systems.”
For Weiss, states and international organizations simply are not doing enough when it comes to industrial control systems cyber security. Until the world’s political elites recognize that industrial control systems cyber security represents a shared security issue, there may be little hope for change. This leads Weiss and others to worry that their worst fears could be realized: a non-state actor successfully launching a major attack on the critical infrastructure of a state.
If such a scenario unfolded, “the impact would be beyond belief.” Aside from the resultant physical damage to critical infrastructure and loss of life, such a scenario would challenge one of the core principles, monopoly on violence, that states claim dominion over in the international system. For this reason, malicious hackers may pose a much more dangerous threat to the international political order than other non-state actors, including organized crime, terrorists, and pirates.

This article was originally featured on The Diplomatic Courier. Due to technical issues with that site, the article was not able to be indexed by Google. However, the article remains live and can be found here.

Time For A New Policy Approach to Fiji?

2011-11-15T21:41:00.000-05:00

For more than two decades, Fiji has endured a coup culture. During the latest military coup in 2006, Commodore Bainimarama removed Prime Minister Qarase’s duly elected democratic government. Since then, Australia has actively leveraged its bilateral and regional influence to urge Bainimarama’s Interim Government to hold free and fair elections. The regime's failure to return to democracy has led to Fiji’s suspension from the Pacific Islands Forum and the Commonwealth.

In addition, Australia has imposed autonomous sanctions, including suspension of ministerial contact and defence cooperation, an arms embargo, and visa restrictions on Interim Government ministers, senior public servants and appointees, ranking Fiji military members and coup supporters, and their families. This group represents, writ large, the resident Fijian leadership and policy elite. It likely also contains a large portion of Fiji’s next generation of leaders.

Fiji has responded by promoting policies aimed at making the country less dependent upon its traditional partners, particularly Australia and New Zealand. It has strengthened ties with non-Western powers, particularly China. It also has worked to transform the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG) into a viable alternative to the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF). Finally, it has reached out to both ASEAN and India in order to further diversify its political and economic relationships.

There is growing criticism of the Australian policy towards Fiji. Critics assert that the hardline Australian position fails to account for the toxic nature of the Fijian Government that was removed from power in 2006. While not condoning the military’s use of force or alleged reports of human rights violations, opponents suggest that Australian policy should be moderated if for no other reason than the fact that it has failed to achieve its stated objectives. They argue that failure to change Australia’s policy approach risks pushing Fiji further from its traditional partners, undermining the West’s strategic interests in the South Pacific.

The Australian Government rejects such criticism outright.

Recently, the voice of the Fijian people captured centre stage in the debate when the Lowy Institute for International Policy conducted a survey of Fijian views on domestic and international issues. The survey reported that 66 percent of the Fijian people said Bainimarama was doing either a very good or good job.

Canberra branded the poll findings as absurd and without credibility - despite Lowy’s standing as the premier independent think tank in the region.

The Lowy Fiji Poll methodology and whether it was able to overcome perceived - or real - fears of intimation and reprisal for answering honestly deserves further discussion and investigation. However, in the absence of hard evidence to undermine the integrity of the poll or credibility of the pollsters, the Government’s condemnation of its findings is troubling. Senior Government officials’ claim to be “surprised” by increased criticism of Australian policy is also odd. If Australia’s policy approach isn’t working, vocal and public criticism is to be expected.

Overall, Australia’s policy has resulted in severe deterioration of its bilateral relationship with Fiji. This was clearly illustrated by Fiji’s declaration of the previous Acting High Commissioner Sarah Roberts persona non grata in July 2010. Now, Fiji regards Australia merely as a “donor country and post-colonial influence” rather than a partner in its future. This is not a position from which Australia can hope to influence Fiji to behave more democratically.

Given that Australia and its partners appear unwilling to employ more coercive tactics (such as military intervention) to achieve regime change, a new policy approach must be considered. The record demonstrates that Fiji can successfully mitigate the punishment that Australia seeks to impose through attempts at regime isolation. Does Canberra expect the current approach to deliver different results in the future?

If the Australian policy approach is not moderated, there is a serious risk of outside actors, including China and India, gaining a stronger strategic foothold in the South Pacific.

Bainimarama, now chair of the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG), is attempting to turn Fiji into the new leader of the South Pacific. As Australia and its partners continue with sanctions, it is no coincidence that the MSG has granted observer status to Asian powers such as Indonesia (somewhat counter-intuitively for the Melanesian West Papuans) and China. As Fiji looks more closely to Asian powers as development partners, Australia risks being left out in the cold.

One of the key soft power tools available to Australia is educational scholarships and student visas. How can Australia expect to positively influence the next generation of Fijian leaders when Canberra has sanctioned many of those who might apply for them by family association with the current regime? These are the future Fijian leaders that Australia should be targeting to demonstrate firsthand the importance and benefits of a broad and deep democratic society.

It is time for a strategic reassessment of Canberra’s policy. The Government must determine whether it should abandon value-based policies that have yet to achieve desired effects. It also must assess whether its current policy approach risks undermining its claim to lead in the South Pacific, a role the country has coveted for the better part of a century. Finally, it must work with its partners, including the United States, to gain better insight into the regional implications of its policy for Western strategic interests in the South Pacific.

This article was originally featured on The Diplomatic Courier and was co-authored by Nicole Forrester of the East West Center. Due to technical issues with that site, the article was not able to be indexed by Google. However, the article remains live and can be found here.

Where in the World is Eddie Walsh?

2011-11-15T11:11:00.000-05:00

It has been a long-time since my last series of blog posts! I am sorry for the inattention to the site - I have been on extensive travel conducting research for my new book.

In lieu of spending time on the blog, my free time has been spent mostly writing OpEds and conducting interviews for other media outlets, including:

Korea JoongAng Daily (South Korea): “Linking Extended Deterrence and Cyber Warfare”
ISN Insights (Switzerland): “Brunei Darussalam's National Security Strategy”
Diplomatic Courier (USA): “Time for a New Policy Approach to Fiji?”
Korea Times (South Korea): “A Better Security Architecture in NE Asia”
The Diplomat (Japan): “Looking Forward in Sri Lanka”
AOL Defense (USA): “Predator Maker Redesigns UAV to Boost Export Sales”
Foreword Report (Australia): “Textron Systems Looks East”

That said, I expect to make a few postings this week, including new excerpts from my recent interviews with the Fijian and Sri Lankan Ambassadors to the United States. Please stay tuned!

Roberts on Brunei National Security Strategy

2011-10-24T05:41:00.001-04:00

In preparing for a new series of articles on Brunei’s national security strategy, I had the opportunity to speak with Christopher (Chris) Roberts, Senior Lecturer in Asian Politics and Security at the National Security College, The Australian National University. According to Roberts, Brunei continues to spend “quite a bit of money” on the professionalization of its military. Separate from defense trade procurements for military modernization, this investment is aimed at developing a “professional force indoctrinated to be independent of politics;” thereby “alleviating a key domestic concern” for the Sultan. On a related note, Roberts believes that the Sultan will be “keen to keep the military separate” through a continued emphasis on the Gurkha detachments. These provide not only a regional strategic deterrent effect but also a hedge against domestic coup attempts.

Tonkin-Covell on Brunei's National Security Strategy

2011-10-24T04:42:00.001-04:00

Over the last two months, I have had the opportunity to interview numerous experts on the national security strategy of Negara Brunei Darussalam (Brunei). These interviews will soon appear in a number of magazine and journal articles. Prior to their publication, I wanted to share a few of the uninterrupted source interviews. The second of these is provided below and features Dr. John Tonkin-Covell, Senior Lecturer in Strategic Studies at the Military Studies Institute, Massey University.

From the perspective of national security, what are Brunei`s core issues? Are they the same today as was defined in the 2011 Defence White Paper?
Brunei would be prepared to use military force to protect its territory, including its maritime areas. (This) incorporates the disputed claim in the South China Sea. (Brunei also) probably (would) be involved with its ASEAN neighbours in matters concerning internal security.

How has the resolution of Brunei`s overlapping territorial claims with Malaysia affected national security? Does Brunei believe that it can reach similar resolution with other claimants in the next 10 years?
Brunei's dispute with Malaysia is ongoing but not pressing. Of greater strategic significance is the Chinese claim, which takes in much of Brunei's offshore oil, and the fact that the Chinese, through their expansion of their 'civilian' surveillance organisation in terms of ships, aircraft, and personnel, … obviously intend to take things further over the next few years. Brunei's problem with the Chinese is a bit down the track (conflict with the Philippines & Vietnam is higher on the board), but it is there.

How does Brunei properly weight traditional (ex. balance of power) and non-traditional (ex. climate change) security issues in its national security planning?
This is hard to say. Brunei makes all the right noises on non-traditional security issues, but the core ones of internal stability and external threat remain higher priority.

Does Brueni support ASEAN becoming more interventionist in regional security issues (ex. Thai-Cambodia border dispute)?
In general terms, no. Brunei considers ASEAN not as any regional alliance at all. So, a non-interventionist ASEAN is more to their liking. Brunei's relationship with the United Kingdom (UK) is very important, and also should be noted perhaps as a sub-text in relation to the Five Power Defence Arrangement which guarantees the territorial integrity of Malaysia & Singapore, and has Malaysia , Singapore, Australia, the UK, and New Zealand as signatories. Brunei is outside this, of course, but the context is important.

Does Brunei foresee a role for ASEAN in Oceania security (ex. Papua New Guinea)? Would East Timor`s admission into ASEAN spur increased engagement?
With regard to Oceania, Brunei is remarkably close minded. They have no concept of the strategic threats beyond Southeast Asia. While Timor MIGHT come into that, anything beyond is not recognised as significant for them.

Brunei supports international peacekeeping efforts and increasing calls on international peace and stability as a core security objective. What precipitated this increased focus on international peace and stability?
Brunei is a monarchy under emergency rule since the 1960s, and has religious and secret police. Stability is a big thing for them, and therefore international efforts in the direction of stability are regarded as important. There is a belief in collective international efforts in the direction of stability.

Will Brunei increase its emphasis on bilateral security cooperation with major powers, especially the US? Does Brunei believe that the basing of US littoral combat ships in Singapore will increase regional peace and stability? Would Brunei be open to such basing in the future?
Brunei is probably indeed going to increase bilateral security cooperation with the US. An illustration of that was Brunei's participation in recent US led naval exercises at a time when some heat appeared to be escalating over China, Vietnam and the Philippines over the South China Sea. Brunei depends on the UK for defence support, but would clearly require the US in any problems with larger Asian powers like China or Indonesia.

What role does Brunei see for India, Korea, and Japan in SEA security? Will their increased engagement support or undermine peace and stability in the region?
Japan and Korea, while important, rate less so. Japan occupied Brunei in WWII, so there is history there. India, on the other hand, is a Commonwealth power, and is seen as a potential and actual partial maritime counterweight to China.

Does Brunei see China`s increasing diplomatic and military assertiveness as a threat to Brunei`s national interests? Are there also opportunities to cooperate with China to promote peace and stability in the region?
Most definitely. The Chinese are regarded as a threat without a doubt. Moreover, any willingness by the Chinese to 'negotiate' assistance has to be balanced against the interests of Brunei and the other ASEAN powers. Brunei has done a remarkably good job in maintaining good relations with China, despite the South China Sea questions.

How has the Arab Spring affected Brunei`s national security strategy? How has the unrest in Malaysia affecting Brunei's national security planning? Are there long-term implications from these two events? How can the military help ensure continued regime legitimacy?
The Arab Spring has thrown into sharp relief Brunei's lack of democratic government, and human rights policies. There is undoubtedly nervousness about the Arab Spring, although the Sultan possesses the means and probably the wisdom to move to ameliorate effects locally. His successor, whoever that is, may be more problematical in terms of competence.

Would a more formal security organization (ex. NATO) in Asia-Pacific support or undermine Brunei`s national security objectives? Can ASEAN ever serve as the basis for the formation of such an organization from the perspective of Brunei?
Brunei and the Five Powers Defence Arrangements (FPDA) should be noted here. SEATO used to exist, but the stomach for such a re-emergence of a formal security alliance is not on the cards, as the nuances of the complex Southeast Asian relationships and history mitigates against what would be seen as a return to the past.

How important is energy security to Brunei`s national security? What can the country do to mitigate the risks of global energy markets?
Oil wealth is fundamental economically to Brunei. Without it, Brunei is nothing. Brunei hopes that its offshore oil reserves will last for three more generations. The posture of the RBAF is aimed at energy security as a priority.

How have cyber threats and terrorism affected Brunei`s national security planning? Is this a reason to strengthen its relations with the US?
The extent to which cyber threats affects national security planning is unclear, although it has no doubt registered quite strongly given British support in defence matters. Terrorism is very much a part of the picture, and has been a priority since the Malayan Emergency. Modern Jihadist terrorism is problematical with regard to the proximity of Indonesia and Malaysia, and Brunei has also played an ambivalent role with regard to terrorist & insurgent activity in the southern Philippines. Piracy and transnational crime are also complications. These would be reason enough to look to greater ties with the US.

How does Brunei perceive European powers as its security guarantors? Can they be a hedge or are there no real options other than the US?
Britain is the security guarantor of Brunei, along with FPDA. How far that goes can be seen looking at the Confrontation period of the 1960s. The FPDA powers and the US make for useful options for expansion in the future, plus perhaps the Philippines.

Other thoughts on Brunei’s national security strategy?
The RBAF is very small, and comes from a tiny population base, so while cash for equipment is less of a problem, the (personnel) aspect is an obstacle. What really underpins Brunei's national security is the presence of Royal Dutch Shell as a multinational company and the presence of British personnel in the form of the Gurkha units in Brunei. Without those in place, Brunei would be very much more vulnerable.

Thayer on Brunei's National Security Strategy

2011-10-24T04:24:00.002-04:00

Over the last two months, I have had the opportunity to interview a number of experts on the national security strategy of Negara Brunei Darussalam (Brunei). These interviews will soon appear in three magazine and journal articles. Prior to their publication, I wanted to share two of the uninterrupted source interviews. The first of these is provided below and features Emeritus Professor Carlyle A. Thayer, School of Humanities and Social Sciences, The University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy.

From the perspective of national security, what are Brunei`s core issues? Are they the same today as was defined in the 2011 Defence White Paper?
Brunei’s core interests are defined by the Sultan. They include preservation of the monarchy, Brunei’s territorial integrity against threats to its offshore oil and gas infrastructure, and external subversion directed across its land borders.

How has the resolution of Brunei`s overlapping territorial claims with Malaysia affected national security? Does Brunei believe that it can reach similar resolution with other claimants in the next 10 years?
The resolution of the dispute over Louisa Reef ended what might be termed a minor irritant. Brunei has always played a low key role with respect to the South China Sea. Brunei huddles with ASEAN and will support efforts to implement the newly adopted guidelines on implementing the declaration on conduct of parties in the South China Sea. Brunei will further support ASEAN’s efforts to negotiate a code of conduct with China. But Brunei will not take the lead in these discussions until it assumes the Chair of ASEAN in 2013. Brunei has little expectation that China’s claims to waters lying in Brunei’s EEZ, as illustrated on China’s 9 dash line map, will be resolved in the next decade. Fortunately for Brunei, with the exception of Louisa Reef, there are no other major features in these contested waters. In mid-2005, China’s president, Hu Jintao, visited Brunei and promoted future joint development of marine resources in disputed areas.

How does Brunei properly weight traditional (ex. balance of power) and non-traditional (ex. climate change) security issues in its national security planning?
Brunei’s 2011 White Paper gives greater stress to non-traditional security issues than its 2004 White Paper and 2007 strategic guidance. This shift in emphasis reflects current thinking among ASEAN states. Brunei views low intensity conflict, particularly by non-state actors, as more likely than conventional state-on-state conflict. Brunei’s national security perspective is mainly shaped by what it views as a relatively non-threatening external environment. This is reflected in Brunei’s failure to follow through on some big ticket defence purchases. To the extent that the armed forces are tasked with dealing with non-traditional security issue these relate to disaster relief, counter-drug trafficking and counter-terrorism.

Does Brueni support ASEAN becoming more interventionist in regional security issues (ex. Thai-Cambodia border dispute)?
Brunei supports whatever consensus emerges in ASEAN. It is not a keen supporter of a more proactive ASEAN in dealing with regional security issues, especially if it involves friction China or other external powers. Brunei pursues a low-key non-offensive approach to regional security issues. Brunei was concerned about possible spill-over affects of the Thai-Cambodia border clashes on external perceptions of Southeast Asia’s stability. But Brunei was not in favour of pushing Indonesian monitors on an unwilling Thailand.

What is Brueni`s outlook for peace and stability in SE Asia over the next ten years? What are the country`s major concerns? Are its defense budget increases a reflection of its concerns about regional stability?
Brunei is vitally concerned that tensions in the South China Sea do not erupt into armed conflict. Brunei is also concerned about the peaceful maintenance of the balance of power as China’s contest U.S. primacy. Brunei also holds concerns that Indonesia’s democratic transition could unravel. Brunei’s prime concern is the depletion of its oil reserves and its inability to diversify the economy. This could generate instability.

Does Brunei foresee a role for ASEAN in Oceania security (ex. Papua New Guinea)? Would East Timor`s admission into ASEAN spur increased engagement?
Brunei generally does not favour an expanded security role for ASEAN because of the stress this would put on Brunei’s limited resources. Brunei would look to Australia with respect to instability in PNG. As for Timor-Leste, Brunei will follow Indonesia’s lead.

Brunei supports international peacekeeping efforts and increasing calls on international peace and stability as a core security objective. What precipitated this increased focus on international peace and stability?
Brunei has only recently come around to giving stronger endorsement to regional peacekeeping and stability operations. This is a result of the evolution of ASEAN policy and as a result of U.S. pressure to support the Global Peace Operations Initiative.

Will Brunei increase its emphasis on bilateral security cooperation with major powers, especially the US? Does Brunei believe that the basing of US littoral combat ships in Singapore will increase regional peace and stability? Would Brunei be open to such basing in the future?
Brunei followed Singapore in granting the U.S. forces access after the U.S. was forced to vacate its bases in the Philippines in 1992. Brunei welcomes the presence of foreign troops such as Singapore, Britain and the U.S. and will continue to do so. Brunei views a U.S. presence in the region as stabilizing and was one of a handful of regional states to openly support the U.s. Proliferation Security Initiative aimed at countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. Brunei quietly supports the presence of U.S. littoral combat ships as providing a rapid response capability. Brunei is more likely to host visits rather than provide permanent basing facilities.

What role does Brunei see for India, Korea, and Japan in SEA security? Will their increased engagement support or undermine peace and stability in the region?
Brunei generally adopts ASEAN perspectives on the role of external powers. India, South Korea and Japan are all ASEAN dialogue partners. Brunei views Japan and India as two powers that can contribute to the security of Southeast Asia’s maritime environment including security for sea lines of communication.

Does Brunei see China`s increasing diplomatic and military assertiveness as a threat to Brunei`s national interests? Are there also opportunities to cooperate with China to promote peace and stability in the region?
Brunei does not view China as a direct threat to its national security or interests. The Sultanate of Brunei has a long history of relations with China extending back to the imperial era. In 1999-2000 china signed long term cooperation framework agreements with all ten ASEAN members. Seven of these agreements, including the one signed with Brunei, included a clause for defence cooperation. The China-Brunei agreement was short and only identified cooperation in science and technology and defence in general. Between 2002 and 08, Brunei and China exchanged seven high level defence visits including a visit to Brunei by China’s defence minister. Brunei has also hosted one PLAN port visit.

How has the Arab Spring affected Brunei`s national security strategy? How has the unrest in Malaysia affecting Brunei's national security planning? Are there long-term implications from these two events? How can the military help ensure continued regime legitimacy?
There are few signs of discontent in Brunei directed against the Sultan. The ordinary citizens of Brunei benefit from the social welfare and education policies of the present government. Despite draconian internal security laws, the Brunei state is not repressive to the extent of its counterparts in the Middle East. Unrest and political instability in Malaysia is always a matter of concern especially it potential to spill over and affect Brunei. But political events in peninsular Malaysia do not automatically translate to East Malaysia – Sabah and Sarawak. The Royal Brunei Armed Forces are tasked with border security and surveillance and can be expected to step up their efforts if instability should affect neighbouring states. Regime legitimacy in Brunei is based on tradition and Islam. The military can contribute to regime legitimacy by remaining an apolitical professional force.

Would a more formal security organization (ex. NATO) in Asia-Pacific support or undermine Brunei`s national security objectives? Can ASEAN ever serve as the basis for the formation of such an organization from the perspective of Brunei?
There is little prospect for a ASEAN becoming a more formal security organization. Rather, ASEAN itself is building a Political-Security Community as one of the three pillars supporting an ASEAN Community by 2015. Brunei has been a participant of the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting (ADMM) process. The ADMM’s role is gradually evolving and Brunei is comfortable with this pace. The development of ASEAN defence relations is also being conducted in tandem with its dialogue partners. Brunei’s national security is not undermined by either development.

How important is energy security to Brunei`s national security? What can the country do to mitigate the risks of global energy markets?
Energy security is absolutely vital for Brunei because of its dependency on hydrocarbons. Brunei’s oil reserves are nearing depleting and its gas reserves will be depleted by 2050. These trends could be offset by new discoveries. Brunei’s national security would be affected if China moved to oppose Brunei’s development of new energy reserves in areas claimed by China. Brunei’s internal security is threatened if the money earned from energy reserves declines and social welfare support for Brunei citizens is cut back. Brunei has a large and growing youth population that is unemployed. Brunei needs to diversify its economy. It has failed to follow Singapore’s example by effectively developing its human resources to meet future challenges.

How have cyber threats and terrorism affected Brunei`s national security planning? Is this a reason to strengthen its relations with the U.S.?
Brunei has only been indirectly affected by terrorism. It is of concern because terrorism affects the stability of nearby countries, such as the Philippines and Indonesia. Brunei has supported and participated in regional counter-terrorism cooperation. Brunei has also worked closely with the United States and can be expected to do so in the future. But the threat of regional and international terrorism in Southeast Asia has declined markedly. As the Brunei armed forces acquire more sophisticated C4SI equipment and capabilities the importance of cyber threats to national security will increase. One problem that Brunei faces is its dependency on foreign expertise in this area; there are not sufficient of Brunei citizens trained for IT security.

How does Brunei perceive European powers as its security guarantors? Can they be a hedge or are there no real options other than the U.S.?
Brunei views the United Kingdom as one of its main security guarantors and permits the UK to base military forces on its soil. Brunei also views individual European countries as sources of defence equipment, particularly Germany and Switzerland. But the weight of Brunei’s trade relations lie in the region not with Europe. Any threat to Brunei would involve the immediate interests of Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. Brunei would look to these countries for support. At the same time, Brunei would look to Australia, the United States and the UK for support.

U.S. Navy: F/A-18 Super Hornet provides survivable next-generation capability

2011-10-08T01:02:00.002-04:00

Many countries in Asia-Pacific are looking at the F/A 18 Super Hornet as a possible gap solution for their next generation fighter needs. I have written extensively on the trade offs between the F-35 and F/A-18 before and will need to do so again. I therefore spoke with a USN representative earlier today regarding the F/A-18 program. While the topics discussed will be addressed in a future report, I wanted to share them as soon as possible.

In purchasing the F/A-18 Super Hornet, (certain countries) have argued that the platform provides them with air superiority for the foreseeable future. However, critics have countered that Russian and Chinese fifth generation fighters would be able to achieve air dominance against the F/A-18. How capable is the Super Hornet in achieving air superiority in the Pacific over the next twenty years?

The Navy continues to invest in capability upgrades to F/A-18A-D Hornets ensure their sustained survivability and viability in tomorrow's threat environment. These capability upgrades include things like Link 16, Joint Helmet Mounted Cuing System, additional radar enhancements, continued EW suite improvements, along with improved targeting capabilities including Advanced Targeting Infrared (ATFLIR) and precision weapons enhancements.

The F/A-18E/F Super Hornet flight plan represents a survivable next-generation capability with advanced fused sensors (Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) Radar, Infrared Search and Track (IRST), ATFLIR, Electronic Warfare jammers, ALR-67(V)3 Digitally Cued Receiver), Distributed Targeting System, IP-Based Linked Networks and advanced air-to-ground and air-to-air precision weapons operating on an open architecture backplane.

(Certain countries) are using a modular-based integration approach for their systems on (future US aerial platforms). This enables them to place systems on the platform without being integrated into the baseline infrastructure. Sources that I have spoken with claim that this is the future of U.S. platform sales abroad and the program offices for a variety of reasons, including indigenous systems development demands by buyers. How do you see this modular based integration affecting the current and future F/A-18 program? Are there options for providing buyers with more leeway in integrating their systems outside of the baseline infrastructure?

Responding to the needs of numerous current and potential foreign customers, the F/A-18 and EA-18G program office provides some flexibility in integrating non-U.S. sensors and weapon systems into the Hornet and Super Hornet baseline. The PMA265 international business teams lead contracting and integration efforts on behalf of international business partners to incorporate Multifunctional Information Distribution System (MIDS), software configuration set commonality, Communicator Interrogator Transponder with mode 4 and common weapons such as AIM-120, AIM-9X and JSOW.

Should US Fear Cyber Proliferation?

2011-10-05T13:55:00.001-04:00

In an interview today, I spoke with Kristin Lord, vice president at the Center for New American Security (CNAS). We discussed the current cyber security threat environment facing the United States.

One of the topics that we addressed was whether the U.S. still maintains an edge in offensive cyber capabilities. This topic arose from conversations that I had with other experts on cyber threats emanating from Asia.

In response, Lord told me that “nobody really knows if (the United States) is ahead in offensive capabilities or not. I have heard mixed views both inside and outside of government and military.”

However, she did acknowledge that “many countries are developing offensive capabilities, including our allies.” And, she believes they may be doing so in an evolving threat landscape: “there is increasing fear that these capabilities will be available on the open black market.”

If countries such as China, Iran, and North Korea turn to these markets to advance their national interests, Lord believes that it “may not be necessary (for states) to develop (offensive cyber capabilities) themselves.”

This obviously introduces serious cyber proliferation concerns for American policymakers, which is the topic of my next article for The Diplomat.

U.S. Air Force General: Military Sales to Asia-Pacific Critical

2011-09-28T17:46:00.000-04:00

Speaking at the Air & Space Conference and Technology Exposition, General Gary L. North, Commander of Pacific Air Forces, argued that U.S. military sales to Asia-Pacific partners helps ensure they maintain the capabilities and interoperability necessary to defend their national interests.

According to North, regional allies have to modernize but it “is very important that we stay in-step together.” In modern strategic combat situations, a key aspect of this will be to ensure that the U.S. and allied nations “can share information across portals,” which U.S. exports to the region help support.

While acknowledging that “every nation has an inherent right to purchase what is in their national defense (interests),” North downplayed concerns that partners might be limited in unilateral situations based upon an over-reliance on U.S. platforms. When asked if decisions to commit to modern platforms (such as the F-35) could leave partners dependent upon U.S. support (ex. infrastructure, sensors, etc.) to effectively utilize these assets, he countered that “a handshake and a relationship” underpin U.S. exports so long as “both parties adhere” to agreed upon boundaries in the relationship.

Faced with looming defense cuts, North also said “Ideally, we will (still) go where we have to go; where the mission is.” To do so, he contended that the U.S. Air Force must: 1) Maintain weapon systems in sufficient quantity to meet requirements; 2) Ensure that the weapons fleet is survivable against global threats; 3) Field platforms that can both penetrate and survive on missions requiring penetration.

Resolving Asia-Pacific Security Issues with Think Tank Diplomacy

2011-09-26T23:01:00.006-04:00

In late July, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and Lowy Institute for International Policy announced the launch of the Pacific Partners Initiative (PPI). PPI serves as the first Washington-based policy & think tank forum dedicated to providing a sustained high-level policy focus on Australia, New Zealand and the Pacific Island Countries. In addition to dedicated research, programming, and new media engagement, PPI introduces trilateral Track II dialogue as a mechanism for addressing regional security issues.

Experts believe that PPI's Track II dialogue will serve as important new lever for the peaceful resolution of complex security issues across Oceania.

In a recent interview, U.S. Ambassador (Ret.) John W. McDonald, Chairman and CEO of the Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy (IMTD), went so far as to argue that “Track II diplomacy initiatives, such as PPI, will be increasingly important to the maintenance of peace and stability in Asia-Pacific … Too many critical security issues facing the region are undermined by government officials who are prone to making flagrant statements and being uncompromising as a result of domestic factors.”

McDonald also asserted that Track II dialogue “would help to expose these errors in judgement … and ensure that conflict resolution remains on-track despite potential short-term missteps along the way.”

While McDonald is right to point out the obvious benefit of expert commentary on antagonist positioning around regional conflicts, Andrew Shearer, Director of Studies and Senior Research Fellow at Lowy, contends that an equally important contribution of PPI will be its ability to attract the attention of policymakers to the region and propose new policy recommendations for their consideration.

This will be especially critical in the United States (U.S.), where experts believe few policymakers and scholars yet recognize the geopolitical importance of Oceania to U.S. national security interests.

Speaking with The Diplomat earlier this month, Ernest Bower, Head of Pacific Partners Initiative (PPI), echoed this point: “The U.S. government currently doesn’t have the capability to address issues in Oceania. The government tends to be reactive not strategic in this region. And think tanks aren’t looking at issues in Oceania. This has created a screaming gap in focus on Australia, New Zealand, and Pacific Island Country security issues. We need to think about what should be the U.S. strategy for engagement in Asia-Pacific over the next 20 to 30 years.”

In Bower’s eyes, PPI fills a critical void in Western policy circles by “stretching the boundaries” of strategic dialogue on Oceania security issues and enabling third party experts to more critically assess the Pacific policies of Western and regional governments.

That said, PPI first will have to overcome a number of serious challenges that face Track II initiatives in Asia-Pacific. Experts believe the two biggest will be achieving a critical mass of influential organizations and overcoming government indifference.

Challenge 1
Securing a critical mass of participants will be difficult given that Australia, New Zealand, and Pacific island states lack a tradition of independent think tanks.

Bower recognizes this challenge: “Neither Australia nor New Zealand possess a large number of independent think tanks (capable of engaging in Track II dialogue). We hope that PPI will encourage more independence of think tanks in Australia and New Zealand beyond the Lowy Institute.”

While Bower hopes to resolve this problem by encouraging the proliferation of more independent regional think tanks, McDonald argues that PPI can mitigate this risk by looking beyond just think tanks: “Setting up independent think tanks is not the first step here. (Track II diplomacy) doesn’t need to be limited to think tanks.” McDonald instead believes that PPI should open its membership to leading non-governmental organizations to complement existing think tank members.

Another solution may be to include other Asia-Pacific countries in the initiative, including think tanks from ASEAN, Canada, China, France, India, Japan, Russia, South Korea, and France. Shearer is open to this approach: “Once the PPI has developed some momentum, I can’t see any reason not to engage think tanks from other countries as well – so long as they share the overall objectives of a stable, prosperous, free and open region.”

Challenge 2
Building a strong partnership with government actors, who may not be open to collaboration with non-governmental entities, also poses a major challenge to Track II initiatives in Asia-Pacific.

McDonald believes that PPI must be prepared to mitigate this challenge, “across the world, Track I (governments) do not want Track II to succeed. Governments usually do not appreciate the advice of Track II actors early on in the process. To overcome this, Track II must prove their usefulness to (Track I) and change the minds of government actors.”

Fortunately, PPI is well positioned to bridge the divide between the two tracks thanks to its founding members – CSIS and Lowy. Experts believe that this will significantly lower the barrier for securing U.S. and Australian policymaker consideration for PPI policy recommendations.

Strategic Implications
Although it will take time for PPI to overcome these challenges, experts believe the initiative is well positioned to play an active and vocal role in resolving complex regional security issues, including domestic instability in Papua New Guinea and the military coup in Fiji.

Beyond this role, Shearer contends that PPI can simultaneously emerge as an important mechanism for advancing U.S. strategic interests in Asia.

While “the increasing presence of other major powers (may be) reinforcing the need for enduring U.S. engagement in the South Pacific,” as Shearer contends, this loftier goal will likely first require PPI to overcome the knowledge-gap that persists in America.

Given that U.S. policymakers have traditionally paid little attention to China’s rise as a major aid donor in the South Pacific, the international struggle over the region’s wealth in fish and minerals, or the efforts of Pacific Countries to diversify their sources of foreign investment and development assistance, the ability of PPI to drive increased awareness and improve basic understanding of Pacific security issues will be critical.

If this gap can be closed, PPI stands a stronger chance of being consequential in maintaining peace and stability in Asia-Pacific.

As Shearer points out, the U.S. strategic presence in Asia-Pacific “will remain the most important structure underpinning Asia-Pacific security” for some time to come. The issue before PPI then will be how to better leverage that presence and advance Western interests through Pacific engagement.

Air Force Global Strike Command Reveals MTBF for B-52 Strategic Radar

2011-09-26T17:16:00.000-04:00

According to Air Force Global Strike Command, current analysis shows a mean time between failure (MTBF) of 32 hours on average for the B-52 strategic radar. This answer was provided in follow-up to Lieutenant General James Kowalski’s presentation at last week’s Air & Space Conference and Technology Exposition where he outlined component-aging as a more serious concern than platform-aging (air frame) for the B-52 fleet.

CSAF provides F-22 update to AFA convention

2011-09-23T14:28:00.008-04:00

Four new stories will be coming soon from this week’s Air & Space Conference and Technology Exposition. These follow yesterday’s “F-35 Doubts,” which reflected Norwegian concerns with the progress of one of the weapons for the new F-35 and its implications for Australia, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. Each will feature a different general discussing a particular topic of interest. The pieces will be more strategic in focus and will not examine particular programs in great depth. This includes the update that the F-22 was cleared to resume flying earlier this week.

I therefore wanted to take a moment and update everyone on USAF Chief of Staff General Norton Schwartz’s comments on the Alaska investigation. In his press briefing, he said, “I can tell you with authority that what happened in the cockpit was not a hypoxia-related incident.” He also outlined four aspects of the return to flight for the F-22 program: 1) Rigorous pre- and ongoing inspections of systems on the airplane; 2) Equipping pilots with new equipment (including data collection specific equipment); 3) Additional training; 4) Ongoing data collection. Finally, he said the USAF is going to be baselining each pilot’s physiology to better assess the impact of F-22 flight on pilots.

Should Indonesian public diplomacy leverage contemporary art?

2011-09-21T19:45:00.003-04:00

The work of Indonesian contemporary artists like Nyoman Masriadi have huge potential for public diplomacy. In today’s filing for The Diplomat, I consider whether the Government of Indonesia recognizes this value.

PACOM: ADIC as a mechanism through which to drive adoption of NATO standards by ASEAN?

2011-09-20T21:20:00.001-04:00

The Diplomat featured, “A NATO-like ASEAN,” today as part of their CSIS Pacific Forum New Leader Forum. The article analyzes recent comments by U.S. PACOM regarding the impact of the ASEAN Defense Industry Collaboration (ADIC) on U.S. national interests in Asia-Pacific. This includes PACOM’s assertion that ADIC could advance new NATO-like standards within ASEAN that would advance U.S. - ASEAN military interoperability. In addition to background sources, Guy Ben-Ari, deputy director of the Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group and a fellow with the International Security Programme at CSIS, provided on-the-record comments for the piece.

Concerns about changing balance of power in Asia-Pacific fueling Australian debate over Lockheed Martin F-35

2011-09-19T08:51:00.001-04:00

The Swiss Federal Technology Institute Zurich’s ISN Insights, the world's leading open access information system for international relations and security professionals, released my latest article on the Australian F-35 program today: “Australia’s Military Capabilities Up in the Air.” For those familiar with my past work on the subject, the paper builds on past writings and interviews, which have sought to collect the diverse opinions of Australian defense policy experts on the subject. It therefore tackles familiar topics such as Australia strategic calculus for and against the F-35 (i.e. the emergence of Chinese J-20 and Russian-Indian T-50 PAK-FA fifth generation fighters in the region.) It also introduces new areas of analysis, including critically assessing what conclusions from a possible reassessment of the program in Canberra would be most negative for Lockheed Martin’s business development objectives and U.S. national security interests in the region. New discussion topics emerge from this analysis, including whether drones or other emerging technologies will undermine the strategic importance of fulfilling the entire 100 plane order.

Air Force Association President cautions on budget cuts, argues for new bomber, and offers lessons learned from Libya for Asian powers

2011-09-19T02:40:00.001-04:00

Over night, the Arlington Air Force Community at Examiner.com published two articles featuring Michael M. Dunn, President/CEO of the Air Force Association:

The first shares Dunn’s perspective of the continued importance of air power assets for the modern military. In the piece, he argues that American continued dominance as a military power in Asia is dependent upon further investment in the U.S. Air Force, including a new long-range bomber capable of sending a strong signal to East Asian allies (i.e. Japan and South Korea) and potential adversaries (i.e. China and North Korea) that the U.S. intends to sustain the current balance of power gap.
The second outlines Dunn’s views on the lessons learned by Asian powers from Western military intervention in Libya. It follows the recent Gulf News OpEd that we co-authored on Libya’s impact on U.S. - Indian strategic relations. In the new piece, Dunn argues that: 1) The U.S. will be reluctant to prosecute military intervention in a unilateral fashion under the current Administration; 2) Asia-Pacific countries are going to be more hesitant to accept U.S. foreign policy statements at face value; 3) Asia-Pacific adversaries will need to redouble their strategic efforts to counter U.S. power projection in the region and their tactical efforts to develop counter-measures to specific U.S. platforms and weapons systems.

Foreword: Second-guessing Australia's F-35 Plans

2011-09-19T00:01:00.000-04:00

Can the F-35 ensure Western air superiority in the Asia-Pacific? This question inevitably leads to passionate debate among military experts and scholars alike.

Vocal critics of Australia’s $16 billion plus F-35 commitments, such as Carlo Kopp, Research Fellow at Monash University and Co-Founder of Air Power Australia, believe that the F-35 is little more than “a specialised battlefield interdictor lacking the performance, stealth and sensor suite for air superiority.”

In the frankest terms, Kopp reasons “the F-35 is not a viable design and could never meet Australia's national security needs. Claims otherwise have been repeatedly shown to be incorrect, and mostly based upon naive, incorrect or absent assessments of the capabilities of contemporary Russian and Chinese built weapon systems deployed in Asia.”

He backs up his argument by asserting that the F-35’s aerodynamic deficiencies make it unlikely to be employed effectively as an air defence interceptor “while its stealth performance is provably insufficient for defensive/offensive counter-air and anti-surface warfare strike operations against contemporary regional capabilities.” This is despite the Pentagon’s promises that its allies will receive comparable stealth capabilities to American versions of the platform.

He therefore contends that the “F-35 is incapable of making any useful contribution to the defence of Australia's northern sea-air gap,” which most analysts believe is the top national defense priority for the nation.

This begs the question: Why then would Australia continue to pursue such a flawed program?

In Kopp’s assessment, it is because the Australian Department of Defence (ADoD) lacks the internal capacity to properly assess and define Australian air superiority requirements; suggesting that the ADoD has based their next generation platform requirements on “briefings provided by foreign contractors supplying replacement equipment.”

Kopp therefore is not surprised that Canberra is now considering the F/A-18 Super Hornet as a possible gap alternative to the F-35 despite the fact that “the F/A-18F has similar performance and capability deficiencies to the F-35, and is equally incapable of credibly performing against modern regional threats.” In his view, ADoD is just repeating a long-established pattern of behavior in choosing products without aligning them with air superiority requirements.

While his conclusions may seem extreme to American defence strategists, Kopp's perspectives are not surprising to Australian defence policy analysts, who see him as a part of an outspoken but accepted minority that remains variably influential in Australian policy circles. This faction argues that Australian air superiority must be designed to unilaterally counter the most advanced capabilities in the region, including the capabilities of China and India; a position that clearly derives from a larger debate in Australian foreign policy - What represents a probable set of adversary capabilities that must be unilaterally countered in order to ensure Australian national security?

While he does not argue China represents a threat, Kopp contends China does present Australians with a very high strategic risk due to its size and the sophistication of its new generation of weapons. For his camp, Australian air superiority requirements therefore must be based upon the assessed capabilities of squadrons of Indian Sukhoi T-50 PAK-FA and Chinese Chengdu J-20 series fighters rather than the few fourth generation platforms being fielded by ASEAN members. (He assumes that the latter will be progressively replaced in time by the T-50 PAK-FA and export models of the J-20 as smaller nations now buying Flankers switch to buying these platforms in 5-10 years time.)

If the T-50 PAK-FA and J-20 were the benchmark, he concludes the F-35 would be insufficient for head-to-head combat. Furthermore, he posits that “recent advances in Russian and Chinese Surface to Air Missile and counter-stealth radar technology ... nullify designs like the F/A-18E/F and F-35” as well.

Instead, Kopp opines that the F22A is the only viable existing platform capable of ensuring Australian air superiority and enabling optimal support for regional and global peace and stability operations: “The only aircraft type which can credibly compete (with the T-50 PAK-FA and J-20) is the U.S. built F-22A Raptor. If Australia came to the aid of the U.S. with a fleet of 50+ F-22s, it could make a major contribution of high strategic value to the U.S., in any Asia-Pacific conflict. More importantly the F-22 balances strategically any future ASEAN or other Asian buys of the T-50 PAK-FA and J-20 and permits Australia participation in any global interventions where a modern threat exists.”

Unfortunately, as Sam Roggeveen, Fellow at Lowy Institute for International Policy, points out: “Former U.S. Defense Secretary Gates doubled down on the F-35 by ending production of the F-22. For countries like Australia looking for a fifth-generation fighter, the F-35 (currently) is the only game in town.”

While agreeing with Kopp that the F-35 may be insufficient against fifth generation fighters, Roggeveen maintains a polar opposite view on why the debate on Australian air superiority is flawed. For him, it is not merely just a question of adversary capabilities but also of intent.

Roggeveen therefore questions why Australia would need anything more than the F-35 to begin with. Even with squadrons of Chinese J-20s in play, he believes that the only probable scenarios for confrontation with China would involve regional conflicts in far away places such as the Taiwan Strait.

In response, Roggeveen raises an interesting counter-point: “Australia would only ever go to war with China by America’s side. So, even if Australia did have air power that could match the PLAAF and PLANAF one-for-one, could Australia bring decisive strategic weight to any military engagement? At most, we are going to buy 100 (F-35s), and only a fraction of those would be committed to, say, a war over Taiwan. Would that even make a difference to the larger strategic picture?”

From his perspective, the answer is not the F22A (if it were available) or a more advanced next generation platform. Instead, it is at most the F-35 or perhaps even “a cheaper, less capable aerial platform.”

As he observes, the latter would afford Australia the luxury of investing in “a potentially decisive capability such as diesel powered submarine killers (SSKs),” which could be of greater value to the U.S. if a strategic conflict with China ever materializes.

While this might be an interesting strategic option for Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding or General Dynamics Electric Boat, it certainly is not the one preferred by Lockheed Martin, who must ensure that their Australian commitments remain firm. If the company fails to do so, it risks losing future revenue for shareholders and bringing further harm to the F-35 program’s already tarnished image.

This article by Eddie Walsh first appeared on Foreword.

Economic interests of France and U.K. trumped the strategic interests of E.U. in Libya

2011-09-18T14:41:00.001-04:00

Over the last month, I have written extensively on the Libyan and Syrian crises from an Asia-Pacific perspective. This includes the article announcing imminent U.S./E.U. energy sanctions, China in Syria Series at The Diplomat, an OpEd with Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Michael Dunn in Gulf News, and articles at Examiner. As part of my research for those articles, I interviewed Erik Jones, Professor at the Johns Hopkins University SAIS and Director of the Bologna Institute for Policy Research. As with Svante Cornell, the comments provided were extensive and made a number of important points which unfortunately could not be tied back into my reporting. However, those comments provide valuable context for European Union decision-making and will be featured in an upcoming article that I am producing for an academic journal. In the meantime, I wanted to provide his views on European calculations while still timely and relevant.

Does French support for Libyan intervention suggest that France is willing to place its economic interests and humanitarian values above Western national security interests?
No - I don’t think France’s motives were humanitarian. And, I think the main lesson to draw is that France continues to pursue its own national interest narrowly defined. (Separately,) the Libyan intervention is more economic than strategic. Indeed, the strategic move would have been to negotiate with Gadaffi. The fact that Italy didn't even try that suggests that the economic interests of France and the U.K. trumped the strategic interests of the E.U.

How has the Eurozone crises affected the economic power of key European countries?
The Eurozone crisis is an incredible distraction. It does less to affect the power of these countries than to draw their attention away from global responsibilities. The renewed emphasis on fiscal consolidation also draws resources away from the military across Europe. This does less to reduce ‘power’ is broad terms than it does to reduce capabilities in the more narrow military sense.

Does Libya and Cote d'Ivoire suggest that France is more likely to respond with military force to protect its key economic interests globally (i.e. in the event of major conflict in South China Sea)?
No. France has always been a military power but it has always had a rather limited scope for power projection. They are not at all likely to use military threats to contain China.

How has the forced change in Turkish military leadership - long perceived by some in the West as the the safeguards of Turkish secularism - affected E.U. policymaker support for diplomatic and military assertiveness abroad?
Most Europeans are impressed with Erdogan’s ability to gain the upper hand over the Turkish military. I think most people who understand the recent change in Turkish foreign policy are impressed with that as well. Some see this as a success of European integration – civilian control over the military was one of the criteria for accession. Others see it as a consequence of the failure of Turkish accession – Turkey has no choice now but to go it alone. I think both readings are in error. Turkey is gaining in self confidence and would pursue a more independent foreign policy agenda in any event. And the conservative (some say Islamist) segment of the Turkish political elite has deep-seeded suspicions of the military. Don’t forget that Erdogan himself was a target in the late 1990s and early 2000s.

In the long-run, how will the EU countries' emphasis of right to protect in Libya affect its relations with other countries that suffer from deep ethnic and religious cleavages (ex. Indonesia)? Will it limit their ability to strike strategic partnerships?
I think Libya as a special case. As Dana Allin and I argued in the last issue of Survival, Libya was ‘as good as it gets’ as an opportunity for R2P. You won’t see either the U.S. or the European countries do the same in Syria or elsewhere.

SAIC Cyber Security Expert: Regulating the on-shoring of critical infrastructure code development would create 21st century Maginot Line

2011-09-18T14:30:00.002-04:00

This week, I will be releasing a story on U.S. options to address the cyber security issues emanating from Asia (with particular emphasis on China, North Korea, Russia, and Iran). In preparing the report, I interviewed a number of experts, including Robert (Bob) Giesler, SAIC senior vice president and cyber security director. The questions that I posed to him centered on threat posed by the software industry’s increased offshoring of code development to countries know to have cyber warfare programs. According to Giesler, “as the Pentagon and Intelligence Community ask for better costs, there is a push to develop code abroad. Everyone recognizes this but there are ways to mitigate it that are easier and more cost efficient than on-shoring.” On the related matter of whether the U.S. should put in place legislation to force the on-shoring of code development for critical infrastructure code (ex. Google Chrome, Mac OS X, or Microsoft Office), Gieser maintains, “If you regulate, you go back to the Maginot Line. Those with bad intent can manoeuvre around it.” Using China and Russia simply as examples, Giesler points out that the location of where the code is developed is less important than who is writing the code in the first place, “If code can’t be developed (there), they can find someone somewhere else to insert malware.”

SAIS Scholar: "Iran’s change of tone against Turkey suggests that the no-problem policy with Iran ... is now in shambles"

2011-09-18T10:53:00.000-04:00

How does the crisis in Syria undermine/bolster Turkish national interests?
It has the potential to do both. On the one hand, it provides Ankara with an opportunity to strengthen its role as a force of stability and peace in the region. However, on balance, the crisis does more to undermine Turkey’s interests, in at least two ways:

Ankara had invested greatly in developing ties with the Assad regime, and the closely linked rapprochement with Tehran. Now, Ankara is stuck between its ties to Assad and the growing urge, both domestically and internationally, to side with the opposition – domestically, the base of the AKP supports the Sunni opposition, while internationally, the regime’s brutality has made it an outcast.
More deeply, however, the Syrian crisis deals a death blow to the AKP and Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu’s much-touted policy of no problems with neighbors. This policy rested on a focus on dealing with regimes, irrespective of their domestic legitimacy; and on the conviction that neighboring countries would never develop policies that could harm Turkey as long as Turkey had a positive attitude to them. This is now in shambles, as a no-problem policy with Syria would effectively mean watching the brutality take place, but would also mean forfeiting influence in a possible post-Assad Syria.

More importantly, Iran’s change of tone against Turkey suggests that the no-problem policy with Iran, and the AKP government’s refusal to criticize the Iranian regime after the brutal crackdown of 2009, is now in shambles as well.

Do you believe that the Egyptian, Syrian, and Libyan crises have elevated Turkey's importance as a diplomatic and military player in the international system? Have they increased Ankara's importance to the U.S. as a strategic partner?
It appears so on the surface, though the end result will depend on what Turkey can actually accomplish. It has increased Turkey’s diplomatic stance, and for a time taken the heat of Ankara for its cozying up with regimes like those in Damascus and Tehran, since many in the West consider Turkey’s ties useful – but that will only be the case if Turkey can deliver, which remain to be seen. In the longer term, the more interesting question is whether the AKP government succeeds in becoming a model for what could be called “Islamism with a human face”, to adapt a phrase from the cold war – ie. Egyptian, Tunisian and other Islamist movement moderating their image and focusing on elections and regular politics in order to gain power, which they are doing with the AKP as an explicit example. That would certainly bolster Turkey’s role.

Rotten Durians: Unrealized potential of Southeast Asian contemporary art as a public diplomacy asset

2011-09-17T10:53:00.000-04:00

Yesterday, out sister site, Rotten Durians, published an interview with ART HK Fair Director Magnus Renfrew. According to Renfrew, the contemporary art scene in Southeast Asia is on the rise: “There is a very vibrant artistic scene in Southeast Asia at the moment - particularly in Indonesia and the Philippines. There are more collectors and buyers emerging.” The interview will be featured in an upcoming article for The Diplomat on the potential for ASEAN public diplomacy specialists to better leverage Southeast Asian contemporary art to build prestige and influence in the world. I will follow-up with details once it has been released in a few weeks.

Rotten Durians: Nyoman Masriadi comments on SE Asian contemporary art

2011-09-17T03:32:00.000-04:00

Earlier this year, Paul Kasmin Gallery presented the first solo exhibition of Nyoman Masriadi in the United States. Still in his mid-30s, Masriadi has emerged as one of the best known Southeast Asia contemporary artists of his generation. Influenced by television, new media, and video game culture, Masriadi has broken the mold for Indonesian contemporary artists who too often produce works that fail to connect with a global audience.

After the exhibition, I had the opportunity to ask Masriadi about how he would define Southeast Asian contemporary art. Specifically, I wanted to know if he saw an ASEAN regional identity emerging independent of national and regional (ex. Asian) identities. According to Pak Masriadi, this is not the case: “I don't see much of a regional identity within the contemporary arts movement in Southeast Asia. Each artist is seeking to create his own language and his own work.”

Exploring Japanese anime and American pop culture at Intervention 2011

2011-09-16T14:28:00.001-04:00

Today marks the start of Intervention 2011 in Rockville, MD. I will be attending the event and interviewing experts on the influence of Japanese manga and anime on American pop culture. These experts include Matt Blum (Managing Editor of Wired’s GeekDad Blog), Shaenon Garrity (comics creator / editor at VIZ Media), and Jamie Noguchi (artist/creator of the office comedy webcomic Yellow Peril). Given the heavy influence of manga / anime styling and Japanese pop culture in America today, I am looking forward to the conversations. Honestly, I am always amazed there remains a general lack of appreciation for the soft power influence that Japan gains from its culture - outside of public diplomacy practitioners of course.

U.S. expert outlines top three Asian cyber security threats

2011-09-16T13:40:00.000-04:00

In the next week, I will be releasing a new article on U.S. options to address the cyber security issues emanating from Asia (with particular emphasis on China, North Korea, Russia, and Iran). In preparing the report, I interviewed a number of experts, including Sean Costigan, co-editor of the upcoming book “Cyberspaces and Global Affairs” from Ashgate Publishing. (Disclaimer: I authored one of the chapters for the book entitled “ Viewpoint: An alternative prospect on cyber anarchy for policymakers,”) Although our discussion centered on a number of topics, the most important probably was his perception of the top cyber threats for U.S. national security originating out of the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) area of operations. While his comments will be covered in full in the upcoming article, I wanted to share Sean’s top three below:

Industrial espionage aimed at defense industry and high tech sectors
Infiltration of critical infrastructure and military targets
Nexus of organized cybercrime and terrorist fundraising

The National releases new article featuring content from "China in Syria Series"

2011-09-15T03:05:00.000-04:00

Earlier today, The National ran a new article by Daniel Bardsley. It tackles the challenges that China now faces in advancing its national interests in Libya post-recognition of the National Transitional Council. It also features content from a recent interview series that I conducted for The Diplomat, entitled “China in Syria Series.”

The National - “China scrambles to catch up with new regime in Libya”

Belated recognition of Libya’s new leaders leaves Beijing hurrying to ensure it is not left behind in efforts to do business with holder of Africa's largest oil reserves.

OpEd Released: U.S.-Indian strategic relations complicated by U.S. military intervention decision-making

2011-09-15T01:15:00.000-04:00

On September 15, Gulf News published a new OpEd in their columnist section entitled “Complex Play of Indo-US relations.” I co-authored the piece with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Michael M. Dunn, President/CEO of the Air Force Association. It lays out a number of challenges confronting the U.S. and India as a result of U.S. military intervention decision-making in places such as Libya and Georgia. While never questioning the intrinsic value of the budding partnership, the piece does argue that establishing a US-India strategic relationship will not be a cinch, especially if the Arab Spring or other world events necessitate further U.S. military intervention decisions not naturally aligned with Indian core interests.

Bipartisan group of conflict resolution practitioners has yet to receive State Department exemption from ban on material support of terrorism

2011-09-14T17:42:00.001-04:00

On May 12, 2011, a bipartisan group of 18 organizations and 27 foreign policy and peace-building experts sent a letter to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton calling on her to exempt conflict resolution programs and other activities aimed at ending violence from the ban on material support of terrorism. Signatories included well-know organizations, such as Search for Common Ground and the Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy (IMTD), and respected experts, such as I. William Zartman (Professor Emeritus, Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies), Robert F. Schubert (Former President, American Red Cross), and Ambassador (Ret.) Ronald E. Neumann (President, American Academy of Diplomacy).

Their letter was in response to a June 2010 decision by the U.S. Supreme Court, which upheld that a federal statute banning support to designated terrorist organizations applies to individuals and organizations who are using international law to resolve conflict through nonviolent means. The signatories believe that the decision to criminalize their work with such organizations undermines the ability of U.S. organizations and private individuals to “bring fighting factions together and provide alternatives to violence as a means of redressing grievance.”

Four months later, the group has yet to receive their requested exemption from the Department of State. This has led one of the principals behind the letter to decry that State’s lack of response may signal a new “Don’t Ask - Don’t Tell” policy for peace-builders and humanitarian aid specialists. Others remain more optimistic - expressing their hope that Secretary Clinton will receive a delegation from their group this fall to discuss the matter.

While the group awaits formal consideration of their request, practitioners in the field relay that Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project already is having a severe impact on their ability to implement peace-building projects and render humanitarian aid in important crisis areas. Programs in places where listed Maoist and radical religious groups maintain significant political, economic, and social sway (ex. Nepal; Pakistan; Palestine; Lebanon; Somalia) have been most impacted by this ban.

The decision also has affected U.S. non-governmental organizations’ (NGO) ability to secure grants and funding for their peace-building and humanitarian aid efforts. Karen Dickman, Executive Director at IMTD, reveals that the law already has had an impact on her organization: “While it may be handy (for the U.S. Government) to have law in their pocket that they can use when they lack proof of other wrongdoing, the Supreme Court’s decision severely limits where we can do fundraising.”

Kay Guinane, Director of the Charity & Security Network, believes that IMTD is not alone: “This law severely hinders peace-building efforts by making certain projects difficult or impossible (to implement). It is even affecting foreign organization who have U.S. ties (ex. U.S. staff or donors) as it applies to them as well.”

For Guinane, the law simply “does not make any sense.” Practitioners in the field agree, arguing that in many cases, including the 2010 Pakistan Floods, the U.S. Government intentionally has looked the other way and allowed NGOs to quietly work with listed organizations in violation of the law. While this may be a practical way for the U.S. Government to retain a “useful policing tool” without inhibiting the work of NGOs, it forces individuals and organizations simply trying to restore peace through non-violent means to assume legal liability for such actions, which ultimately could mean future prosecution.

Practitioners report that they are starting to see growing support in Congress for their cause. Last month, Sen. Patrick Leahy (D-VT), chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee, reportedly wrote a letter to Secretary Clinton and Attorney General Eric Holder, expressing "deep concern that the current interpretation of the law governing material support for terrorism is prohibiting organizations from delivering essential humanitarian relief in the Horn of Africa.” However, until a full exemption is provided by Secretary Clinton, they believe that their efforts to save lives and promote peace and stability in conflict zones with continue to be impeded.

Vocal critic of F-35 shares view on why F-22 Raptor is a better choice for Australia

2011-09-14T15:28:00.000-04:00

Pnyx re-published my article from the Foreword Report, “The Ones Who Walk Away From Bethesda: RAAF F-35 Deal, Up in the Air?,” under a new title earlier today.

Pnyz - “Ride The Lightning... or Not?”

Can the F-35 "Lightning" ensure Western air superiority in the Asia-Pacific? This question inevitably leads to passionate debate among military experts and scholars alike.

Exclusive Interview: "The F-35 is not a viable design and could never meet Australia's national security needs."

2011-09-14T14:52:00.000-04:00

These past few weeks, I have been providing coverage of the lingering Australian F-35 debate via publications in The Diplomat, East Asia Forum, The Asia-Pacific Reporting Blog, Pnyx, Foreword Report, and Examiner. In preparing this series of articles, I had the opportunity to interview Carlo Kopp, Research fellow at Monash Univerity and Co-Founder of Air Power Australia. Unfortunately, not all of that interview has yet to be used in my reporting. With seven articles in the series now live, I therefore wanted to put his views out there while still timely and relevant. They also provide a different perspective to complement recent feature-length interviews with Alan Stephens and Andrew Davies. Ultimately, Kopp’s comments will be re-captured in two new articles scheduled to post later this month.

Does Australia need the F-35 to achieve its national security objectives? How does the current Australian Administration's perception of the rise of China influence that decision?

The F-35 is not a viable design and could never meet Australia's national security needs. Claims otherwise have been repeatedly shown to be incorrect, and mostly based upon naive, incorrect, or absent assessments of the capabilities of contemporary Russian and Chinese built weapon systems deployed in Asia. The Canberra Department of Defence (DoD) has no organic capabilities of substance in technical intelligence collection and analysis, and have since 2002 relied primarily on briefings provided by foreign contractors supplying replacement equipment. Public statements by the Canberra DoD suggest that the strategic risks arising from the rise of China are not well understood within the organisation. The long standing commitment to the F-35, and the decision to arbitrary procure the F/A-18F to replace the F-111 are empirical proof of this.

From your perspective, why did the F-35 win out against the competition to begin with?

There was no competitive assessment performed for Australia's replacement combat aircraft. The AIR6000 program was intended to perform this function, but was pre-empted in 2002 by an ad hoc decision to procure the F-35. This was made by a small number of senior defence officials, who convinced the incumbent Defence Minister, Robert Hill, that the F-35 was superior to all alternatives, despite ample public evidence to the contrary. A formal AIR6000 study would have forced a formal technical and operational assessment of alternatives, which if performed robustly, would have been unlikely to yield the F-35 as an outcome since the aircraft is by design far too specialised for roles which have historically been a low priority in Australian combat aircraft procurements.

How has Minister for Defence Stephen Smith's national security strategic vision, goals, and objectives affected the F-35 programme?

There is no empirical evidence that Stephen Smith has any strategic vision other than a posteriori justification of Canberra DoD force structure planning choices made during the incumbency of John Howard. While Smith has initiated a large number of reviews, these have generally been delegated to the Canberra DoD and the outcomes from those reviews which have concluded are essentially public relations repackaging of the status quo in policy and practice. This repeats the pattern observed during the incumbency of Joel Fitzgibbon.

If the the Australian Department of Defence reduces its commitment to the F-35, where does Australia likely shift the budget savings?

Assessments of likelihood presuppose a systematic pattern of choices to provide calibration. The ad hoc and arbitrary nature of the F-35, F-111 and F/A-18F decisions suggest that when the F-35 program inevitably collapses due to endemic engineering and program management problems, and its inability to compete against modern air defence threats, the Canberra DoD is most likely to make another arbitrary choice for fighter replacement. Given that all three cited previous decisions were made without any credible and rigorous analytical or technical assessments of combat viability in the region, what choices to replace the F-35 are made will also likely be determined by internal politics within the Canberra DoD, unless there is external political intervention.

Does Australia perceive a serious air threat against its national interests emanating from ASEAN member states?

Until the late 1990s the Canberra DoD planned force structure primarily around the capability to decisively deter or defeat Indonesian capabilities. Post 2001 with the change of regime in Indonesia, the Canberra DoD has primarily focused upon equipping the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) to perform expeditionary COIN or battlefield interdiction operations, whilst publicly espousing the contrary argument that air superiority and strategic strike remain a high priority. The arbitrary choice of the F-35, which is a specialised battlefield interdictor lacking the performance, stealth and sensor suite for air superiority, preempted the formal AIR6000 analysis of alternatives, and the intended capability and performance analyses. There is no evidence that any regional capability developments have impacted the commitment of the Canberra DoD to the F-35.

Some analysts believe that Australia is recognizing the need to diversify its air platforms and that the F-35 is eating into other critical military and intelligence programs. Do you agree this is a factor?

This is at best speculation. Australia has lacked a coherent rationale for RAAF planning since 2002, as the choice of the F-35 was forcefully imposed, and all research and analytical effort on other air power capabilities has been almost completely abandoned by taxpayer funded organisations since then. Diversification of air platforms is a moot argument when the preferred single type platform lacks any credible capability to perform the key operational roles central to the RAAF's purpose since 1941.

There are persistent rumors that Boeing may benefit from the reduced interest in the F-35 in the form of more F/A-18Fs. Why would/would not the F/A 18F be a good fit and are there better alternatives?

The F/A-18F has similar performance and capability deficiencies to the F-35, and is equally incapable of credibly performing against modern regional threats. This has not deterred F/A-18F advocates from promoting the aircraft as a substitute for the F-35. In a regional environment where the dominant non-US combat aircraft will be the Sukhoi T-50 PAK-FA and Chengdu J-20 series, the only aircraft type which can credibly compete is the US built F-22A Raptor. Other aircraft would suffer prohibitive combat losses against either of these aircraft types, and therefore do not present as credible investments in capability.

Is part of the interest in Boeing related to domestic politics given that Boeing has major commercial interest in Australia, including 1,500 jobs at fully off-shored Boeing Australia?

Very unlikely - if previous patterns of thought prevail in the Canberra DoD. Australia's sole industrial capability for airborne weapons system integration and development, operated by Boeing, was arbitrarily closed down with the shutdown of the F-111, and the highly skilled engineering personnel who performed this work mostly encouraged to find employment elsewhere. Some of Australia's most skilled engineers in this area no longer work in the defence industry. The Canberra DoD has a proven track record of not seeing any value in industrial base engineering and R&D capabilities.

Other thoughts or opinions on the F-35 not captured above?
The F-35 lacks the aerodynamic performance to be employed effectively as an air defence interceptor, while its stealth performance in provably insufficient for defensive/offensive counter-air and ASuW strike operations against contemporary regional capabilities. In the most fundamental sense the argument is moot, as the F-35 is incapable of making any useful contribution to the defence of Australia's sea-air gap.

American education on Asia should be a national security concern

2011-09-14T12:52:00.000-04:00

The Diplomat released by latest article under the New Leader Forum, CSIS Pacific Forum section earlier today:

The Diplomat - “Educating Americans on Asia”

A lack of understanding of the Asia-Pacific could hurt US national security interests, says CSIS's Ernest Bower.

Exclusive Interview: "The F-35 is seen as head-and-shoulders the best option for Australia"

2011-09-14T00:27:00.000-04:00

The past few weeks, I have been providing coverage of the lingering Australian F-35 debate via publications in The Diplomat, East Asia Forum, Foreword Report, The Asia-Pacific Reporting Blog, and Examiner. In preparing this series of articles, I had the opportunity to interview Alan Stephens, Visiting Fellow at the University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy (UNSW@ADFA). Unfortunately, much of that interview has yet to be used in my reporting. With seven articles in the series now live, I therefore wanted to put his views out there while still timely and relevant. Ultimately, a significant portion of this interview will be re-captured in two new articles scheduled to post later this month.

Given its geopolitical location and alliances, are air superiority assets a high priority for Australian national security interests when compared to other capabilities (ex. littoral waters dominance)?
Because Australia is an island nation, the ability to ‘control’ the air and sea approaches to the north and north-west (from where threats traditionally have emerged) is regarded as the key to national military security. Consequently, the air combat (air defence/strike) component of the Australian Defence Force (ADF) is considered the single most important capability.

Does Australia perceive a serious air threat against its national interests emanating from ASEAN member states?
Australia does not regard any of the ASEAN states as a threat. On the contrary, it regularly conducts bilateral military exercises with some members, e.g., Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia; and generally has good relations with all of them. And under the Five Power Defence Arrangements Australia is formally linked with Malaysia and Singapore. At the same time, it has been official planning policy for many years to maintain a military technological edge in the region. The F-35 is seen as a critical means of maintaining that edge for the next 20-30 years.

How does Indonesia's pursuit of the KFX with South Korea influence Australian decisions on the F-35?
None whatsoever. With the best will in the world, the Tentara Nasional Indonesia - Angkatan Udara (Indonesian Air Force) is decades away from becoming an advanced air power. They must first resolve systemic problems across almost every discipline. (For more on this, see Stephens’ chapter, ‘The Asia-Pacific Region,’ in Global Air Power.)

In the last two years, how have the rise of China and India, Russia, and expanding engagement of the U.S. and its East Asian allies in Asia-Pacific security affected the F-35 programme?
None of India, China or Russia is considered a threat to Australia. Indeed, China is now our largest and most important trading partner (and Japan is the second). At the same time, successive Australian governments have been concerned by the changing balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region, especially China’s remarkable growth. As that growth is rapidly translated into impressive military modernisation, Australian defence planners have been keenly aware of the need to enhance our ‘strategic’ capabilities. This outlook explains the plan to acquire 12 new submarines; and to equip the Air Force with F-35s, tankers, and AEW&C, among other things. We’re looking for capabilities that can exert a disproportionate response, and that can shape and deter in the region.

From your perspective, does Australia need the F-35 to achieve its national security objectives? How does this Administration's perception of the rise of China influence that decision?
Unquestionably yes. And as stated above, while China is not regarded as either a threat or hostile, its military rise cannot be ignored.

The Government cites repeated delays and ballooning costs in the F-35 program as well as delivery delays and cost limits as the reasons for taking another look at the F-35. From your perspective, are these the reasons (for Canberra’s reassessment)?
My take is that most people accept that the F-35’s development is back on track, after frustrating delays, and that it will clearly offer the best capability for Australia. The issue now, and it’s a serious one, is the constantly increasing price tag. Matters haven’t been helped by what are regarded as Lockheed Martin’s less than forthcoming statements on the subject.

Why did the F-35 win out against the competition to begin with?
The F-35 is seen as head-and-shoulders the best option for Australia. It’s the only available 5th generation strike/fighter; it will be superior to the F-22 in Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), which is hugely important,and not sufficiently publicized, and strike; and, as a part of the total air defence system the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) has constructed (JORN, AEW&C, Vigilair, KC-30 tankers, etc), it will be the best air superiority fighter in the region. The RAAF strongly favours the F-35.

How have Minister for Defence Stephen Smith's national security strategic vision, goals, and objectives affected the F-35 programme?
Smith has not unreasonably been frustrated by a series of acquisition/force structuring fiascoes in the ADF in recent years, mostly to do with the Navy. He’s understandably become suspicious of the whole process, and I think that suspicion has probably now extended to the F-35 program, despite its recent improved progress. Smith is also aware that, in contrast to the Navy blunders, the RAAF effectively bypassed the usual (i.e., often failed) acquisition process when it bought the C-17 and Super Hornets. These were bought more or less ‘commercial-off-the-shelf’ (COTS), and are regularly cited in Defence circles here as great acquisition successes. Presently Defence cannot spend the acquisition funding it’s been allocated because of system inefficiencies. More ‘COTS’ purchases therefore seems an attractive way to go. Canberra is rife with rumours to that effect.

How about experiences gleaned from Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, and regional peacekeeping operations?
Personally I think the Libya operation has thus far provided an exemplar of how the West should apply military force in the Middle East (as opposed to what we’ve done in Iraq and Afghanistan). But to answer your question, I don’t think Libya has had much of an impact on our decision-makers – possibly because scores of Western soldiers aren’t being killed there most weeks. By contrast, Iraq and Afghanistan – especially the latter – have soured politicians and public alike against involvement in COIN operations in distant lands. I also think they are not considered relevant to the central ‘defence of Australia’ question.

Some analysts suggest that the increased US troop presence planned for Darwin reduces the need for Australian operated F-35s. Do you agree?
I don’t see how troops on the ground can substitute for strike/fighters – they’re entirely different capabilities. The F-35s will provide rapid and credible power projection, as well as ISR and air defence. In any case, Australian defence policy is based on having a self-reliant ability to defend our own real estate.

Some analysts believe that Australia is recognizing the need to diversify its air platforms and that the F-35 is eating into other critical programs, including unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and other military and intelligence assets. Do you agree this is a factor?
Again, no. The RAAF is already operating a small force of UAVs in Afghanistan and will undoubtedly expand its activities in that sphere. However, because of the vital place of air combat in our strategic outlook, UAVs will not yet be acquired at the expense of front-line manned aircraft. Perhaps a more likely outcome would be to replace some of our AP-3C Orions with UAVs instead of, say, P-8s, in ten or so years. And again, I think the ISR capability of the F-35 has not been fully recognised.

In 2009, Australia took delivery of the first of 24 F/A-18F Super Hornet multi-role fighter aircraft manufactured by Boeing to replace ageing strike bombers while Australia awaits delivery of the F-35s. There therefore are rumors that Boeing may benefit from the reduced interest in the F-35 in the form of more F/A-18Fs. Why would/would not the F/A-18F be a good fit?
The Super Hornets have been a considerable success with the RAAF. They have been extremely impressive in regional exercises and are very popular with their Australian crews. At the same time, the F-35 will be a superior system and remains strongly preferred by the military. However, noting my comments above about acquisition difficulties and presently-available funds, it may be the case that Minister Smith will be attracted to buying some additional F/A-18Fs, which inevitably would come at the expense of part of the F-35 order.

Is Australia less than satisfied with the performance to-date of the prime contractor, Lockheed Martin?
My observation – and it’s only that – is that the ADF and the RAAF have good relations with LM. It’s also my observation that the generally negative media reporting about the F-35’s delays and cost increases has damaged public and political perceptions of the F-35.

Is it likely that Australia will make such a major investment in a U.S.-led coalition R&D programme soon? Why or why not?
I think it’s unlikely. Australia is closely involved with various US agencies in smaller, niche R&D work, e.g., hypersonics, VLF radar, composites, etc. But, I think the overall experience with the F-35 will discourage future large-scale arrangements.

Defense of northern sea-air gap remains core national security interest in Australia

2011-09-13T02:47:00.000-04:00

As Australia considers the fate of its F-35 commitments, the larger question of the relative importance of manned fighters and fifth-generation platforms for maintaining an absolute edge in regional air superiority certainly will be a matter of debate. However, what likely will not be debated - for historical, political, and economic reasons - will be the relative importance of defense of the continent’s northern perimeter.

According to experts, this focuses attention on (and allocates budget to) air superiority (and maritime dominance) capabilities:

Sam Roggeveen - Fellow at Lowy Institute for International Policy: “There is a broad consensus that the best way to defend Australia is through the ‘sea-air gap’ to our North rather than on land. Air superiority is critical for that mission.”
Dr. Alan Stephens - Visiting Fellow at the University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy: “Because Australia is an island nation, the ability to ‘control’ the air and sea approaches to the North and North-west - from where threats traditionally have emerged - is regarded as the key to national military security."
Dr Carlo Kopp - Research Fellow in Regional Military Strategy at Monash University: “Australia's geography and the historical experience of the 1940s dictate air superiority to be the single most important role for the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF). Furthermore, many of Australia's most important economic assets are now situated across the Northern arc of the continent, which presents a major strategic vulnerability.”

Removal of Nepalese Maoists from terrorist list would open door for U.S. NGOs to implement peace programs

2011-09-12T11:09:00.002-04:00

On August 31, the U.S. Department of State confirmed that it has initiated the process of removing the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoists) from the list of Specially Designated Global Terrorist. This would be welcomed news for U.S. non-governmental organizations, such as the Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy, who have sought to implement peace-building programs in the region. According to the Chairman of IMTD, Ambassador (Ret.) John McDonald, such efforts have been stymied in the past because of the risk of U.S. domestic prosecution for working with a designated terrorist organization. The ultimate removal of the Maoists, who represent a sizable and influential political force in Nepal, will eliminate the need for a waiver from the Secretary of State for such programs in the future.

F-35 would be insufficient against T-50 PAK-FA and J-20 according to Australian analyst

2011-09-11T23:49:00.001-04:00

A few hours ago, the Foreword Report released my latest article, “The Ones Who Walk Away From Bethesda: RAAF F-35 Deal, Up in the Air?” It features the opinions of one of the most outspoken critics of the F-35 program in Australia, Dr. Carlo Kopp of Monash University and Air Power Australia. It also balances these views with commentary from Sam Roggeveen of the Lowy Institute for International Policy. Both have appeared previously in my reporting on the F-35 in Australia.

Reviewers of the draft inquired about the titling of the article, so I wanted to briefly address that here. As a young adult, I was captivated by a short story by Ursula K. Le Guin called “The Ones Who Walk Away from Omelas” It speaks of a Utopian town marred by one abomination: a child kept in perpetual filth, darkness and misery. Ultimately, the citizens of the town make one of two choices - either justify the child’s condition through their own existence or walk away from the town.

For me, the title was fitting for a story which prominently features a pundit’s view of the F-35 program in Australia. This vocal faction of experts, of which Kopp can be included, clearly dispel niceties in their opposition of Australia’s $16 billion plus F-35 commitment. Their critique appears fueled by a passionate belief that the Australian Government and other stakeholders are failing to do what is in the best interests of its citizens (and Australia's national security) as they move forward with what they view as an ill-conceived acquisition from Bethesda, MD-based Lockheed Martin (NYSE: LMO).

To be clear, the title does not reflect my endorsement of any side in the debate. Those views will become clearer when I publish my OpEd on the subject in a few weeks. Instead, it seeks to illustrate the polarization of opinions on the program in certain Australian policy circles. This clearly introduces major challenges in predicting what happens next given that Canberra is not Omelas - its decision on how to proceed on the F-35 program is not a binary decision on whether to stay or walk out on its 100 plane commitment.

Washington welcomes Libyan ambassador

2011-09-11T11:11:00.002-04:00

On Friday, the United States accredited Libya's latest ambassador, Ali Suleiman Aujali. In having his credentials accepted, Ambassador Aujali becomes one of the first Libyan diplomats to be fully credentialed since the the regime's fall.

Exclusive Interview: Libya complicates U.S. counter-proliferation efforts in North Korea

2011-09-10T21:14:00.000-04:00

The Diplomat graciously is hosting a series of interviews conducted with American and regional scholars on the impact of the Syrian uprising on relations between Asia-Pacific powers.

As part of that series, I had a chance to speak with Thomas L. McNaugher, a professor in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. McNaugher is a veritable expert on global security, having served as Senior Analyst at RAND, Director of its Center for Asia Pacific Policy (CAPP), and Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution.

As with other U.S. and E.U. scholars, I questioned him on the strategic impact of the Arab Spring on Asia-Pacific affairs.

Unfortunately, since his comments were limited to Libya, they could not be included in the current series. They therefore will appear in an upcoming article on the impact of Western military intervention in North Africa on American counter-proliferation efforts with North Korea and Mynamar.

In the meantime, I wanted to publish McNaugher’s comments in their entirety as I feel they present an interesting lens from which to view Libya beyond just the local and regional implications of regime change.

What is Libya impact on Asia-Pacific affairs from the perspective of Asia-Pacific powers?
McNaugher: One fairly obvious link from NATO's attack on Libya to security in East Asia can be seen in North Korea's near-immediate reaction when the bombs first fell: This wouldn't be happening if Libya had kept its weapons of mass destruction. U.S. policy toward North Korea has been based on the so-called "Libya model": If you agree to give up your WMD, there is no end to the great things we can do for you. Events in Libya totally undermine that approach. It's doubtful that Pyongyang had much interest in the “Libya Model” in any case, but, after the bombing of Libya, one has to figure that the North Koreans will give up their nuclear weapons, if ever, only at the end, rather than the beginning, of a long process of engagement and confidence building.